

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

JAPAN'S POST-COLD WAR SECURITY POLICY: THE ROLE OF KOREA

by

Hongsik Hyun

December, 1994

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
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis illustrates why Japan should play a more important role in South Korea's strategic planning and policy making by demonstrating that Japan is a economical global power with innate aspirations of becoming a political superpower. This is accomplished by forecasting Japan's security policy of post-cold war era using a historical analysis of post world war II Japan's history, and augmented by a strategical analysis of three key indicators of Japan's future security policy: Japan's strategical environment, economical environment, and domestic condition. The thesis recommends that the need of cooperation between South Korea and Japan and ways for South Korea to cooperate with Japan.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. TRENDS IN JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY FROM 1945 TO	
1990	7
A. DEVELOPMENTS OF POST-WAR SECURITY POLICY	7
1. Forming Postwar National Strategy (1945-1960)	7
a. The Yoshida Doctrine (1945-1954)	7
b. Anti-Yoshida Line (1955-1960)	29
2. Institutionalization of Yoshida Doctrine (1960-72)	32
3. Expanding Independent Security(1973-1990)	36
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE	
ESTABLISHMENT	47
C. FROM RENUNCIATION OF WAR POTENTIAL TO SENDING TROOPS	
OVERSEAS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE	51
III. THE KOREA ISSUE IN JAPAN'S COLD WAR SECURITY POLICY	57
A. THE KOREAN WAR	59
B. JAPAN-ROK DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION	65
C. KOREA AS A FACTOR IN JAPAN'S SECURITY AFTER	
NORMALIZATION	70
IV. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA	93
A. THE CHANGES OF WORLD CIRCUMSTANCES	93
B. OVERALL IMPACT ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION	94

C. THE RISE OF JAPAN AS A POST-COLD WAR POWER	99
V. PROSPECTS FOR JAPAN'S POST-COLD WAR SECURITY POLICY . . .	105
A. CONDITIONS	106
1. Strategic Factors	106
a. Japan-U.S. Relations	106
b. Japan-Russia Relations	115
c. Japan-China Relations	121
2. Economic Factors	129
3. Domestic Political Factors	131
a. Public Opinion	131
b. Impact of the Gulf War	136
B. PROSPECTS	142
VI. THE COMMON BASES OF SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN	
SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN	147
A. SOUTH KOREA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS	147
1. Unification	147
2. Military Security	148
3. Economic Security	149
B. THE NEED OF COOPERATION WITH JAPAN	151
1. Economic Security	151
2. Politico-Military Security	154

VII. THE ROLE OF KOREA	159
A. KOREAN'S VIEW OF JAPAN	159
1. South Korea	159
2. North Korea	166
B. IMPACT OF KOREAN UNIFICATION ON JAPAN'S SECURITY	173
1. Security Threat	175
2. Economic Threat	179
3. Fear of Refugees	181
VIII. CONCLUSION	183
ENDNOTES	189
BIBLIOGRAPHY	203
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	209

LIST OF TABLES

1. Japan's Merchandise Trade by Area(1992)	100
2. Japan's Direct Overseas Investment by Region	100
3. Japan's Trade Surplus and FDI	130
4. South Korea's Trade Balance in Major Goods with Japan in 1991 . . .	152

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War and the relative decline of the United States' commitments for regional defense in the Western Pacific, makes the region's security very complex. Japan's emergence as an economic superpower with the existing historical legacies of Japanese military expansionism, intensified the complexity of the region's security environment. It has increased people's concern about Japan's future intentions, especially in terms of its security policy for the region's peace and stability.

It seems that Japan is already acting as one of the political superpowers in world politics with its vast economic resources. Japanese society is moving toward becoming a "normal nation," which means that it becomes easier for Japan to develop its military capability. Japan has the capability to build up its military in a large scale. Thus, the future direction of Japan's security policy depends on Japanese intentions rather than Japan's capabilities.

The Japanese have been very reluctant to increase their military capability even under the security threats from the communists bloc--mainly the Soviet Union-- during the Cold War era. While the Japanese attitude has moved toward right position, their perception of threat has decreased significantly resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Japan's security policy will be mainly influenced by its foreign relations rather than by its own initiative. There is little possibility for Japan to collide with the United States and China. While the prospects for Japan's security relations with Russia are not so bright, the possibility of collision is not high, either. Thus, the future direction of Korean unification will significantly influence the region's security environment, especially Japan's security policy.

The situation on the Korean peninsula looks very serious today because of North Korea's nuclear issue. But in the long run, it seems that South Korea is in a good

position to achieve its ultimate goal of reunification. However, there are many obstacles for South and North Korea to achieve that goal. Unfortunately, since the division of the Korean peninsula was not decided by their own will, but by foreign powers, it will be very difficult to unify the two Koreas into one Korea without getting all four major powers' cooperation. All the four powers are playing off one another and the two Koreas for their own national interests. Thus, if the conflicts among the four powers intensify around the Korean peninsula, Korea will have to face another risk of being a scapegoat for other big power countries' power politics. Therefore, South Korea's need for cooperation with the four powers--the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, becomes very high. Among them, China and Japan's position will be much stronger than their role during the Cold War era.

Economic growth will be the main factor strengthen South Korea's position in dealing with unification problems and post-unification issues (i.e, to build up North Korea's economy to a common level). For this reason, the stability of Northeast Asia is a necessity for South Korea. Therefore, for South Korea or a unified Korea, the need of for cooperation is bigger than that of confrontation with neighboring countries.

It seems that it will not be so difficult for South Korea or a unified Korea to manage its foreign relations with the United States, China, and Russia compared to Japan, because of the historical legacies between the Koreans and the Japanese. Conversely, the necessity for cooperation with Japan for South Korea's national interests (or a unified Korea) is bigger than that of any other country. Thus, if South Korea or a unified Korea could not escape from the ghosts of the past in its relations with Japan, it would be more harmful to South Korea or a unified Korea.

Unification is Korea's destiny and it would be better for Japan to give its full help toward that goal. A Korea that is unified will be strong enough to resist any internal or external threats. And it will be an important factor in contributing to the stability and prosperity of all Northeast Asia.

I. INTRODUCTION

To some extent the bipolar system of the Cold War contributed to a lasting peace since World War II. Whether or not it was due to the fear of nuclear terror between the two blocs-- led by the Soviet Union and the United States, is debatable.¹ This "long peace" reflected the realism of international politics, (particularly the balance of power theory) rather than the superiority of any idealist theory.² The collapse of the Soviet bloc made possible the superpower status ascribed to the United States. As a consequence of this change, if we accept hegemonic theory, we can expect a long 'real' peace without genuine U.S-Soviet continued confrontation. According to Gilpin, a hegemon can maintain the stability of the system by providing public goods³ to states which make up the system. Hegemonic conflict arises from an increasing disequilibrium between the burden of maintaining a hegemonic position and the resources available to the dominant power to perform this task.⁴ In this context, is the United States a real hegemonic power? It is undeniable that the United States is still a superpower, however, many people doubt the capability and will of the United States to be a hegemonic power. There are many parts of the world which cannot be controlled by the United States for its own interests.

Examples are the nuclear capabilities of the former Soviet Republics, and the economic powers of the European Community and Japan. Moreover, the cost of continuing Pax-Americana and the cost of providing other countries with 'public goods' does not make the achievement of a Pax-Americana highly probable. This, in turn, increases the uncertainties of this era created by the victory of the United States over the Soviet bloc.

One of the key characteristics of these uncertainties is regionalization of world politics. As the confrontation between the two superpowers ended, the possibility of conflicts on a global dimension decreased significantly, but the probability of regional conflicts caused by ethnic difference, historical animosity, and even emotional conflicts, freed from the restraints of the Cold War, between and among local countries increased. The Gulf War, the Somalia and Rwanda disasters, and war in Bosnia support this argument. In turn, the responsibility of regional organizations and regional states to solve regional conflicts increases significantly.⁵

Another characteristic of the end of the Cold War is the increasing influence of economic power in world politics. Relative economic performance was obviously a key factor in the end of the Cold War. The inefficiency of the Soviet Union's economy could not support its militarized

and ideology-oriented communist regime. As a result of this, many countries have focused on developing their economies rather than emphasizing on ideology and a military build up. The influence of economic superpowers, like Japan and Germany, on world politics has increased significantly. Some people do not hesitate to suggest that the real winner of the Cold War was not the United States, but Japan and Germany, which emerged as the new economic superpowers. Another aspect of the world economy is increased interdependence. While increased interdependence of the global economy can contribute to cooperation among nations, different styles of capitalism can also be another conflicting factor between nations or economic blocs.

There were many positive movements in Northeast Asia as a result of the end of the Cold War. Diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China were normalized in 1990 and 1992, respectively. As a response to those movements, talks toward the normalization of diplomatic ties between North Korea and Japan started just after the normalization of relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union. North Korea also used the nuclear issue as an opportunity to open talks with the United States about diplomatic normalization. Also, there are some movements to stimulate military security and economic cooperation,

such as ASEAN-PMC, security forums which Japan and the former Soviet Union suggested, APEC, and the Tumen River Area Development Program.

Although the global dimension of the Cold War ended in Northeast Asia, there are still remnants of the Cold War in the region. North and South Korea still confront each other on the Korean Peninsula which has been one of the most dangerous theaters during the Cold War era. Moreover, the tension is worsened by the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation. The dispute over the Kuril Islands remains an unresolved issue between Japan and Russia. Even if the North Korean nuclear issue, and unification of the two Koreas were resolved within a democratic society and market economy framework, great potential still exist to create destabilizing regional conflict, such as historical animosities between Korea, China, and Japan.

The picture of Northeast Asia is rapidly changing from that of the Cold War era. As the influence of the two superpowers lessen in the region, regional states' influence is increasing significantly. China, Japan, and the two Koreas are becoming key players in their own terms. One of the prominent features of this changing era in the region is the emerging role of Japan. The nuclear issue of North Korea has been the main problem for the

peace and stability of the region since North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty. A main reason for the United States, China, and South Korea to respond so sensitively about North Korea's nuclear option is concern for Japan's future position. Nobody wants to give Japan a pretext for building nuclear arms. In turn, many governments are questioning Japan's future role in political and military dimensions. While people do not hesitate to say that Japan is an economic hegemon in the region, doubt exists regarding the feasibility of Japan's military and political hegemonic power. Because China and Korea have bitter experiences of Japan's military expansionism prior to the end of the World War II, they are extremely sensitive about Japan's strategies, especially its military movements. Nevertheless, as the presence of the United States military lessens, it may be natural for Japan to build up and improve its military posture. In fact, there are considerable debates within Japan about whether to become a "normal" nation in terms of national defense and foreign policy. Even though Japan has no intention of threatening its neighbors by improving its military power, to the Asian nations which suffered bitter experiences during the World War II, it may still be considered a great threat--"a security dilemma."

The future of the Korean Peninsula also has the possibility to exacerbate this security dilemma in the region. If we assume that Korea will unify in one or two decades, a "unified Korea" with a military force of perhaps 1.7 million troops, and growing economic power will be very threatening to Japan's sense of its national security.

With this context as the basis of my thesis, I will examine the trends of Japan's security policy since the end of the World War II, investigate the prospects for the future of Japan's security policy, and explore plausible alternatives for South Korea or a unified Korea. As the result of this analysis, I will suggest possibilities for cooperation in security terms between South Korea (or a unified Korea) and Japan, survey the possibilities of a Korean-Japanese entente.

II. TRENDS IN JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY

FROM 1945 TO 1990

A. DEVELOPMENTS OF POST-WAR SECURITY POLICY

1. Forming Postwar National Strategy (1945-1960)

a. The Yoshida Doctrine (1945-1954)

Defeated in World War II, Japan, like its ally Germany, was forced to confront the humiliation of occupation by foreign troops. But for Japan there was an important difference. While the occupation was theoretically an "allied" affair through the eleven member Far Eastern Commission, in actuality it was exclusively American.⁶ The country would not be partitioned into Communist and non-Communist sectors and there would be no zones of occupation, each controlled by troops from a different country. Not only were the military elements of the occupation entirely from the United States, but the determination of policy was kept as a closely guarded, American prerogative. In the event of differences of opinion among the allies, the operating principle was the policy of the United States would govern.⁷

During World War II, U.S. policy on Asia focused on checking Japan's expansionism. In line with this, the United States tried to induce the

Soviet Union into war against Japan, and to support China in increasing its capability to resist Japan. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor made the United States and China true allies. American policy with regard to China, as defined by Secretary of State Hull, came to be directed toward two goals: to insure China could remain effective in her fight against Japan, and to raise China to great power status so that she might serve as a stabilizing influence in postwar Asia.⁸ Immediately following World War II, American foreign policy turned to the task of creating a peaceful environment in East Asia based on its idealist position strengthened by the postwar public sentiment. Plans were made for the reorientation of Japan's political and economic systems so that she could become a peace-loving and prosperous contributor to regional and global stability. In China, the opposing factions were to be reconciled to form an effective coalition government, enabling a strong, united and democratic China to take her place as a major world power and guarantor of Asian stability. Korea, as promised at the Cairo Conference, was to become free and independent, "in due course," through national self-determination.

The direction of occupation policy, in broad outline, had been set forth in the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945 by the United States, Britain,

and China. The declaration called for the removal of those responsible for the war and punishment of war criminals. The structure of the economy would be transformed to prevent rearmament and allow for the payment of reparations. Democratic values would be instilled and imperialist ways abolished. Japan would lose its overseas possessions, limiting its sovereignty to the four main islands plus some minor ones.⁹

In line with this, an American-led Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) implemented this policy under the strong personal influence of General MacArthur. Once in place, the first objective of the occupation, and the most immediate, was the demobilization of the Japanese armed forces. This meant bringing approximately six and a half million soldiers and other personnel back from the many battle grounds, disposing of their weapons, and finding some sort of employment for them and reintegrating them into society. Related to the repatriation and demobilization of troops was the dismantling of the organizational structure of the military, which formed the basis of government and politics.

To ensure that Japan's authoritarian and imperial past would not be repeated, a greater concern for civil liberties and human values was to be instilled into the population. Further, procedures were to be found that

would promote such an attitude in every day practice. This goal was closely tied to reforms in education. Conversion from war production to a peacetime economy occasioned policy disputes among the authorities and hardship for the people. Munitions industries were dismantled or converted. Several plans were developed to deal with the *zaibatsu* issue.

As a result of this policy, the empire was dismembered and all Japanese abroad, soldiers and civilians alike, were returned to Japan. The military services were demobilized; paramilitary and ultranationalist organizations were dissolved. State sponsored *Shinto* ceremonies were disestablished. Armaments industries were dismantled. The Home ministry was abolished. The police were decentralized, their powers curtailed, and their authority to regulate speech and thought revoked. Political prisoners were released from jail.¹⁰

The Occupation took action to remove the old leadership, too. The position of the Emperor was changed. Formerly sacred as well as sovereign, he was stripped of all "powers related to government" to become the "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power." Top Japanese government officials held responsible for the war and for crimes

against humanity were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Seven of those, including General Tojo, were hanged in December 1948, and sixteen were sentenced to life in prison. Several thousand lower ranking personnel also confronted postwar justice and many were executed.

In addition to those war criminals, a second group of people was identified to be purged from government service. A list was prepared of 220,000 persons to be removed from office and barred from holding any future position, of whom 190,000 were military officers.¹¹

In general, the occupation policy produced the desired effect. The Japanese no longer had the means or the will to take up arms, either for attack or for defense.¹² However, the reforms had intrinsic limits resulting from the fact that the reforms were forced by outsiders.

The Occupation declared its intention to democratize and reform the bureaucracy. But this effort was constrained by, among other things, the inability of Americans to govern Japan utilizing their own resources. As a practical matter, it was necessary to work through the existing Japanese bureaucracy. In fact, even before the end of the war, MacArthur had envisaged "maximum utilization of existing Japanese governmental agencies and organizations."¹³ This dependence proved a major barrier to a

complete and effective purge of right-wing elements in the government and economy. Many of the former top officials in the previous government escaped the purging process. When concern for the threat from the left replaced worries over revived militarism, the old conservative elite was rehabilitated and wartime sins forgiven, or at least ignored. Ultimately the occupation failed to reduce the power of the bureaucracy or to make it more politically responsible to the people.

Despite strong opposition from several quarters, the Emperor was retained. Because, in a gesture marked by foresight and imagination, the greater symbolic value of the Emperor for Japanese pride and the need to gain their cooperation was recognized. Hard-liners in the Occupation opposed the retention of the imperial institution, maintaining that the Japanese would never understand and practice democracy so long as any vestige of the emperor-based system remained.

Even though several plans were executed to deal with the *zaibatsu* issue, the breakup of the *zaibatsu* was essentially a failure. Even prior to the end of the war, the business community took measures to protect itself from blame for starting the war and for losing it. The occupation could not overcome the resistance and foot-dragging by Japanese government and

business, which were more comfortable with a hierarchically structure system of industrial organization than with "industrial democracy."¹⁴ Many of the old political and economic elites survived. Moreover, by the late 1940s opposition to the idea of crushing the *zaibatsu* was growing within the American business community, that combined its economic interests with the changing situation of the evolving cold war. In the end the *zaibatsu*, which were family-based holding companies, were simply replaced by *keiretsu*, networks of companies held together by common linkages to banks and trading companies.¹⁵

Despite some limits of the reform, the success of the occupation's efforts to shift Japan from war-like state to a "peace loving state" resulted in the creation of the so-called Peace Constitution in 1947. When the Japanese government came up in February 1946 with what MacArthur felt to be unsatisfactory proposals for constitutional reform, he had his own staff quickly draft an entirely new document, originally in English. After only slight modifications by the Japanese cabinet, this was presented to the Diet as the Emperor's amendment to the 1889 constitution. It was passed by this body with only slight alterations, and went into effect on May 3, 1947.

The new constitution reflected much of Western democratic political philosophy. The new constitution made two basic changes in Japan's political structure. One brought the theory of the Emperor's position into line with reality by transferring his "sovereignty" to the Japanese people and by making it absolutely clear that he was merely "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people", and had no political powers whatsoever.¹⁶ Now, it became impossible for Japanese politics to be controlled by a small group in the name of the emperor, like had often been done prior to the end of World War II.

The other major change in the constitution was its unequivocal establishment of a British-style parliamentary system. The constitution made explicit the supremacy of the House of Representatives which has to rely closely on the people's will.¹⁷ Above all, the Occupation's goal of demilitarizing Japan was achieved in Chapter II, Article 9 of the new constitution, which called for the permanent renunciation of war.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The Occupation operated on the premise that Japan was the principal threat to the tranquility of the Far East. It was assumed that if Japan's military power were destroyed, Japan and its neighbors would live in peace. There would be no aggressors, and therefore no need for defense. If the peace of the Far East were somehow to be threatened again, the new United Nations would protect it.¹⁸

However, as the Cold War evolved in Europe and the communist's threat became obvious in Asia, U.S. policy toward Asia changed rapidly. The Western powers and the Soviet Union failed to reach an agreement on the four-power administration of Germany at the Moscow Conference in 1947, despite more than two years of unsuccessful efforts to fulfill the wartime agreements of Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam. As such, the conference marked a turning point in relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the beginning of a new American policy to contain the Soviet Union and other Communist states within their existing borders. This "containment policy" can be summed up that the U.S. tried to protect the free world from becoming communist by tying its allies together through collective and bilateral agreements led by the United States, and assisting them to increase their own power to defend themselves from internal and

external communist threats. This containment policy of the United States resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty of Organization(NATO) and the Marshall Plan in Europe.

As the conflict between the nationalists and the communists deepened in China, the whole picture of East Asia changed fundamentally. It was believed that the amount of required assistance to establish "free" China was more than the U.S. government was willing to provide, and confidence in Chiang Kai Shek's ability to govern, even with substantial American aid, was extremely low. As a result, the United States resolved not to become directly involved in the Chinese civil war,¹⁹ and the Chinese communists came to power in October, 1949.

The U.S. response to these developments was well expressed in the statement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January 12, 1950. He defined America's defensive perimeters as stopping west of a line running through the Aleutian Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines. Notably, this line omitted Formosa, to where the Nationalist Chinese government had just retreated after having been driven off the Chinese mainland by the Communists, and South Korea, where war was only months away.²⁰

As a result of these developments, the United States decided to use Japan, the defeated enemy, to replace China in the American security scheme for East Asia, and to build her up to serve as the kingpin to overall Asian stability and security.

Japan's domestic situation also contributed to the shift of U.S. policy from reform to recovery. Production in 1947 was only 37 per cent of the prewar level.²¹ The effect of labor reform resulted in the best conditions for communist revolution. Predictions about Japan's future were uniformly pessimistic. The awful poverty of the early post-war years was no basis for a stable, parliamentary democracy.

In line with this analysis, several economic and social reforms changed their courses and even reversed their courses. The Dodge Plan, introduced in 1948, called for deflationary measures intended to make Japan economically self-sufficient by 1953. Big business was back in favor because of the advantages of "economies of scale." In 1949, earlier labor reform laws were revised and a more restrictive Taft-Hartley type of legislation was passed.²²

This bad condition also strongly influenced General MacArthur to initiate his efforts for an early peace settlement in 1947. He seemed to

believe that an extended occupation would produce bitter anti-American feeling in Japan, and Japan's bad economy was becoming a burden on the American tax payers. Therefore, he insisted, the only way to solve this problem was the conclusion of a peace treaty at the earliest possible date--a treaty that would end the blockade and readmit Japan to world trade.²³ In security terms, he desired to see Japan become the Switzerland of the Far East, and if Japan's security was threatened, the United Nations could provide Japan with its security guarantee.

Yet, the position of the U.S. government was much different not only from that of General MacArthur, but also controversial among the different players in Washington. Within the State Department, a committee headed by Dr. Hugh Borton was drafting a peace treaty under instructions from Secretary of State James Byrnes. This draft treaty was intended to make possible a United States-Soviet agreement on Japan. It forbade Japan to rearm for twenty-five years, and placed the Japanese Government and economy under Allied supervision and surveillance. Moving on an entirely different tack was Mr. George Kennan, who was at the time establishing the Policy Planning Staff to formulate cold war strategy. The Policy Planning Staff was preoccupied with European situations, but it was implicit in Mr.

Kennan's view that cooperation with the Soviets was unlikely, and that American policy should be to prevent Japan from falling under Soviet control. Rather than conclude an early peace and end the Occupation, the War Department preferred to continue the Occupation in order to give the United States the greatest possible freedom in using Japan as a base for military operations in the Far East.²⁴

The Japanese cabinet under Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, initially intended to seek security guarantees from the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China, and to declare Japan's permanent neutrality. This was a little more realistic position than that of the Occupation authorities.²⁵ As the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union grew, Japanese leadership felt that there was no way for Japan to provide for defense against foreign invasion and to protect her independence, except by an alliance with a third power--the United States.

Before a peace treaty initiative surfaced from General MacArthur, Prime Minister Yoshida with Foreign Minister Ashida were already prepared for this initiative. If the major powers--the United States and the Soviet Union-- had agreed to cooperate in ruling over Japan as in Germany, it would have been fateful for the sovereignty of Japan and the rebuilding of

its self-respect. And if they agreed with making Japan the Switzerland of the Far East, it would have been very vulnerable to foreign threats especially from the Soviet Union which already occupied the "Northern Territories." The Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan in August 1945, in disregard of the neutrality pact still in effect between them deepened Japanese doubts on the efficacy of neutrality as a means of providing for Japan's future security. And it seemed that conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union were inevitable. They assumed that if the superpowers were to become rivals, they would need allies. Allies, however dependent and vulnerable, possess a certain value. They hoped that the Japanese government could translate that value into bargaining power, which in turn would give to Japan a measure of independence.

Then, who was more suitable for the ally of Japan? The choice of the United States as an ally was almost a forgone conclusion. Not only were American troops occupying Japan, but Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Ashida had been opposed all through the 1930s to war against the United States. This opposition, which resulted in their leaving the Government several years before the Pearl Harbor, was not entirely a matter of ideology. It stemmed from their strategic view, which was that the United States was Japan's most

dangerous enemy and most desirable ally--that the success of Japan's policy on the Asian Continent, and that safety of the Empire, depended not simply on avoiding war with the United States but on cooperation with it.

Following the Pacific War, this view was more applicable than ever. To Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Ashida, it seemed obvious that American naval and air power could protect Japan from the Soviet Union and ensure its access to world trade. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, although occupying the northern islands within sight of Hokkaido and posing a real threat to Japan's security, appeared to be a continental land power, incapable of protecting the Japanese islands against the United States or ensuring Japan the means of economic survival. Moreover, the Soviet Union did not occupy Japan. Unlike those taken by other allied forces, the prisoners taken by the Soviet Union were not promptly repatriated to Japan. When they reached Japan in the spring of 1947, the intentions of the Soviet Union became obvious. They tried to swing Japan into the Soviet orbit, if not by direct attack, then by an internal communist take over.

Japanese leadership thought that an 'external threat' could be repelled by the guarantee of the ally's power. But regarding 'internal' threats, such as a radical revolution, they thought that if they depended on

the United States forces to protect them against internal threat, it would be impossible to seek Japan's sovereignty. Thereby they concluded that they had to have a national police to protect the Government from being taken over by the communists. As a result of this analysis, Yoshida tried to a finish peace treaty with the United States in their own terms as early as possible, and he had insisted upon building a nation-wide police. But the U.S. Government and General MacArthur had agreed with the former, but refused to allow the latter.

After the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, and after the Korean War broke out, the Cold War developed rapidly in Asia, too. This Cold War rivalry offered Japan both dangers and opportunities. The dangers were that Japan would be drawn into the Cold War politics, expend its limited and precious resources on remilitarization, and postpone the full economic and social recovery of the Japanese people. Conversely, Soviet-U.S. rivalry offered certain opportunities. The Cold War made Japan strategically important to the United States and gave Yoshida bargaining leverage. He reasoned that Japan could make minimal concessions of passive cooperation with the Americans in turn for an early end of the Occupation, a long-term guarantee of its national security, and the opportunity to

concentrate on all-out economic recovery.

In the early 1950s, in accord with the principles of the containment policy, the State Department of the United States tried to establish a regional security organization similar to NATO in the Pacific that would facilitate Japanese rearmament but keep it under international control. John Foster Dulles, special emissary of the Secretary of State, insisted upon Japan's rearmament as a precondition before the end of the occupation.²⁶

While Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru insisted on creating a nation wide police, he was opposed to Japan's massive rearmament and to Japan's entry into a regional collective security system. Prime Minister Yoshida was unwilling to participate in such a multilateral Pacific security system, which, he realized earlier, would draw Japan into the Cold War politics. Instead, Yoshida contrived to trade bases on Japanese soil for a U.S. guarantee of Japanese security and keep Japan as lightly armed as possible so that the nation could concentrate all its energies on economic growth and social development. But regarding internal threats, such as a radical revolution, he thought that if Japan depends on the United States for internal security, it will be impossible to seek Japan's sovereignty. He suggested that Japan could protect itself through its own devices by being

democratic and peaceful and by relying on the protection of world opinion. He argued, Japan had a constitution, that was inspired by American ideals and the lessons of defeat, that it renounced arms, and that the Japanese people were determined to uphold these principles and to adhere to a new course in world affairs. He even manipulated Socialist party leaders to whip up anti-rearmament demonstrations, during Dulles's visits.²⁷ He further pointed out to Dulles the fears that other Asian countries had of a revived Japanese military.

Kenneth B. Pyle summed up this Japanese response, the so called Yoshida Doctrine, as follows:

1. Japan's economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the United States was necessary for this purpose.
2. Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. Not only would this low posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial development, it would also avoid divisive internal struggles--what Yoshida called "a thirty-eighth parallel" in the hearts of the Japanese people.
3. To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.²⁸

Yoshida himself confided his intention in 1952 to an attentive young aide,

The day [for rearmament] will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle[our security] until then. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect justification. The politicians who want to amend it are fools.²⁹

The young aide to whom Yoshida confided these views was Kiichi Miyazawa, who had served as the last Prime Minister from the Liberal Democratic Party, from November 1991 to August 1993. It is clear that minimum defense and refusal to be involved in collective security are the two basics of security policy in the Yoshida Doctrine.

When General MacArthur authorized the formation of a 75,000 man National Police Reserve force to replace his U.S. forces which moved to Korea to repel North Korea's invasion, Prime Minister Yoshida was doubly relieved by this decision. It provided a solution to the internal security problem, and he hoped it would be a good way out of Dulles' request for rearmament.³⁰ Prime Minister Yoshida did not achieve his goal fully when the Security Treaty was signed between the United States and Japan, September 8, 1951. He gained the independence of Japan and the United States' security guarantee for Japan without forcing it to be involved

into regional security problems, but he had to pay for it.

The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan was highly unequal, preserved many of the Occupation prerogatives of the U.S. military, and in effect rendered Japan a military satellite of the United States. In addition to granting bases to the United States, it gave the United States a veto over any third country's military presence in Japan, the right to intervene to quell domestic disorder in Japan,³¹ the right to project military power from bases in Japan against a third country without consulting Japan, and an indefinite time period for the treaty. In addition, the United States insisted on extraterritorial legal rights for its military and dependents. At the same time, Yoshida was compelled to recognize Taiwan as the legitimate government of China and thus forswear normal relations with the mainland government.³² Moreover, it became more difficult for Japan to recover its Northern Islands from the Soviet Union.

However, Yoshida's firmness spared Japan military involvement in the Korean War and allowed it instead to profit enormously from the United States' procurement orders. Yoshida privately called the resulting stimulus to the economy "a gift of the gods." More such gifts appeared over the next decades.

Since the conclusion of the Security Treaty with the United States in 1951, Japan's security policy has been maintained based on the Yoshida doctrine. The United States has consistently pressured Japan to increase its military capability to meet regional security problem and to share the burden of the United States in the Far East. However, minimum defense spending and avoiding collective security involvement have been the Japanese response to the U.S. pressures.

Yoshida grudgingly agreed to upgrade the National Police Reserve, which MacArthur established in July 1950 with 75,000 men, to the status of national security force in January 1952 with 110,000 men under the pressure of the United States during the peace treaty negotiations. Nevertheless, U.S. pressure on Japan to participate more actively in its alliance system resumed shortly after the signing of the Peace and Security Treaty in September 1951. In October 1951, Congress passed the Mutual Security Assistance(MSA) act, which was designed to consolidate the American alliance system through supplying military equipment including training program and inducing active cooperation of allied powers. In line with this, the United States pressed Japan to accept military aid for a threefold expansion of its forces from 110,000 men National Security Force

to an army of 350,000 men. But after three years of negotiations, the MSA agreement that Japan and the United States signed in March 1954, while acknowledging that "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense, emphasized that Japan can only contribute to the extent permitted by its general economic conditions, and acknowledged that the present agreement will be implemented by each government in accordance with the constitutional provisions of the respective countries." In the month the MSA agreement was signed, the Japanese government, complying with the demands brought by Washington in connection with the MSA agreement, introduced legislation to reorganize and to expand the armed forces, including an air force. Even while providing the legal bases of Japan's subsequent military organization, Yoshida was able to temper U.S. demands in significant ways.

In 1954, the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law created the National Defense Agency(*Boeicho*) with responsibility for ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces with a total of 152,000 men--substantially less than half of what the United States had demanded. Moreover, the upper house of the Diet at the same time passed the unanimous resolution opposing their dispatch of forces overseas on

constitutional and other grounds, a position the government had previously asserted on many occasions in the Diet.³³

b. Anti-Yoshida Line (1955-1960)

After Yoshida was replaced by conservative opponents who were, frankly, political nationalists, and who chafed at his economic-first policies, the Japanese government's approach to foreign and security policy was wholly different from that of Yoshida. They wanted to revise the constitution, to carry out a forthright rearmament, to negotiate a more equal security treaty with the United States, and generally pursue a more autonomous and independent course.

This agenda, which could have succeeded in 1950 if Yoshida had supported it, encountered greater obstacles in the latter half of the 1950s. The left wing of the Japan Socialist Party(JSP) was now firmly in control of the party and passionately committed to an ideological defense of the constitution and a neutralist foreign policy. In addition, their efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to achieve a peace treaty made Washington suspicious of Tokyo's independent course.³⁴ In any case, the JSP had gained sufficient strength in the Diet, and its hold on public opinion through

the media, intellectuals, and the unions made constitutional revision much more difficult.

However, their efforts to increase military capabilities got the approval of the Diet for a National Defense Council in 1956. It established a Basic National Defense Policy and the First Defense Buildup Plan which went into effect in 1957 and was to be completed in 1960. The basic policy reads:

The goal of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression in the future; and if by chance aggression occurs, to repel it; and thereby to preserve our country's independence and peace which takes as its basis the principles of democracy. To achieve this goal, the basic policy is as follows:

1. To support the action of the United Nations, to promote international cooperation, and to achieve world peace.
2. To firmly establish the necessary basis to stabilize people's livelihood, increase their patriotism, and guarantee the security of the state.
3. To gradually build up effective forces to provide the minimum degree of defense necessary in accord with national strength and national sentiment.
4. Until the United Nations is able to acquire the ability to effectively stop external aggression, to deal with it on the basis of the security system with the United States.³⁵

Moreover, their efforts to achieve a much more equal treaty with the United States resulted in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan signed in Washington D.C., on January 19, 1960. Ironically, this treaty, which was achieved by Yoshida's political

opponents, embodies virtually all of Yoshida's ideas. Japan got the explicit guarantee of the United States for the external threats and recovered the residual sovereignty of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. But Japan had the responsibility to defend only the territories under her administration. It meant that the United States had the whole responsibility for the defense of Japan from any external threat, however, Japan had no obligation to cooperate with the United States for defense beyond the territories under the administration of Japan.³⁶ And Japan got some degree of control over the United States forces in Japan through the form of consultation.³⁷ The United States was granted the use of bases in Japan in exchange of the security guarantee.³⁸ Thus, the Treaty is not a "mutual" treaty of security cooperation in the fullest sense.

2. Institutionalization of the Yoshida Doctrine(1960-1972)

Under the next two prime ministers, Ikeda Hayato(1960-1964), and Sato Eisaku(1964-1972), both closely associated with Yoshida, the Yoshida Strategy was institutionalized and consolidated into a national consensus. Ikeda, who had been Yoshida's key economic adviser, finance minister, and a key negotiator in MSA agreement with the United States, suppressed the

divisive issues of political nationalism and instead adopted a political strategy of low posture toward the Socialists, with the intention of establishing political stability and policies of managed economic growth.

A fully self-reliant buildup of our Self-Defense Forces is our present duty as an independent country, but, of course, it must correspond to our national strength and to national conditions....., I firmly believe that our country has the lowest defense expenditures in the world today with which it has been able to maintain peace and security and the remarkable economic development that is the foundation of the successive conservative party administration.³⁹

This was the Prime Minister Ikeda's view of the world in his first major policy speech to Diet. Thus, Ikeda followed the Yoshida Doctrine--economics first--faithfully. Ikeda's efforts resulted in formulating a plan for doubling the national income within a decade. This plan was part of a systematic and well coordinated effort to formulate policies that would steer clear of ideology, raise living standards, and improve social overhead capital. It added up to an exclusive concentration on issues of economic nationalism on which the Liberal Democratic Party, the bureaucracy, the political opposition, and the populace generally could achieve substantial agreement. Almost imperceptibly the appeal of the political Left was coopted, and the country settled down to a long period of enthusiastic pursuit of high growth policies.

As the principal negotiator under Prime Minister Yoshida for moderate defense levels and as one who proclaimed its success in terms of economic and military effectiveness, Ikeda was not one to endorse any greatly increased rearmament. Japan's rearmament was really only the minimum necessary to satisfy the United States so that it could be induced to provide protection if Japan was threatened by external attack. As the Cold War deepened with the advent of the Cuban missile crisis, and the successful test of a Chinese nuclear weapon, the United States increased its pressure on Japan to step up its military capability, but Ikeda did not stray from Yoshida's prescription.

Ikeda did give verbal support to the United States' struggle with global Communism in his speeches, which were sympathetic to the American position. However, he not only let the hard-won right of consultation under the Security Consultative Committee almost lapse in order to avoid attracting the criticism of the opponents to the 1960 Security Treaty, but also permitted a year's hiatus to intervene before pushing through the Second Defense Buildup Plan. Moreover, the Second Defense Buildup Plan focused on improving the quality of the forces rather on increasing the quantity of forces. The mission of these defense forces was

also severely restricted by the refusal to even countenance any participation in direct military operations outside Japan. Ikeda also failed to respond to America's overtures to join the anti-Communist crusade against Communist China, and to improve its relations with South Korea.⁴⁰

Under another Yoshida protege, Sato Eisaku, who succeeded Ikeda and held the prime ministership longer(1964-1972) than any other individual in Japanese history, further elaborated the Yoshida Doctrine in terms of nuclear-strategic issues. Sato enunciated the three nonnuclear principles on December 11, 1967, which helped to calm pacifist fears aroused by China's nuclear experiments and the escalation of war in Vietnam. The three principles held that Japan would not produce, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto its soil. Least the principles be regarded as unconditional, Sato clarified matters in a Diet speech the following year in which he described the four pillars of Japan's nonnuclear policy: (1) reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, (2) the three nonnuclear principles, (3) promotion of worldwide disarmament, and (4) development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁴¹ In 1967 the principles of restraining arms exports to certain countries(Communist countries, countries to which arms export is prohibited by UN Resolutions, and countries

engaged in, or likely to be engaged in, an international conflict) were announced by Sato. This restraint was strengthened in 1976 to the extent virtually prohibiting the export to any country of weapons or installations pertaining to the production of weapons.⁴²

Moreover, Sato had rejected American pressure to increase Japanese contributions to Asian security. During the Nixon administration the issue was raised strongly of Japan's role in the collective security of Asia in connection with the possible return of Okinawa and more broadly the Nixon Doctrine, which declared that the United States would depend on its Asian allies to assume more of the responsibility for containing communism in the region. But the Japanese by this time were overwhelmingly opposed to direct involvement in regional security organizations.⁴³ While South Korea dispatched more than 300,000 troops to fight alongside the Americans, the Japanese avoided direct military involvement. At the same time, the Japanese procurement industry entered a new period of rapid expansion. Profits were staggering. In the late 1960s Washington's annual military expenditure in Japan was almost invariably larger than its expenditure in Vietnam itself.⁴⁴

Through administrations under the two prime ministers, Ikeda and

Sato, the Yoshida Doctrine had been institutionalized and had become a national consensus. Without the Yoshida Doctrine and its apparent constitutional sanctions, the pressure on Japan to contribute in a direct military way to the Cold War effort would have been almost irresistible. Thus, the Yoshida Doctrine had been set as national strategy of Japan by Prime Minister Yoshida and had been institutionalized by his faithful successors through 1960s.

3. Expanding Independent Security(1973-1990)

Japan's foreign policy up to the early 1970s had been based on the assumption that U.S. protection and support could be taken for granted. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the absolute superiority of U.S. military power in the western Pacific, the Japanese Constitution, a poor economy, Japanese anti-war sentiment, and neighbors' fears about Japanese rearming, had made Japan free from the requirement of increasing its military capability and from devising a new national strategy. Japan could pursue an economics-first policy based on a narrowly defined sense of its own self-interest under those circumstances. The changes in the international environment and in U.S. foreign and security policies during the 1970s,

however, threatened all those comfortable restrictions and demanded new responses from Japan. Its leaders realized they could no longer take the benign nature of the international environment for granted but would have to work to maintain it in the face of rapid political and economic changes.

The Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which expressed the responsibility of an indigenous nation to defend itself from the communist expansionism, the United States' approach to mainland China, and the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam encouraged Japanese leaders to doubt the credibility of the United States' security guarantee.

The two oil crises were great shocks to not only Japan's economy, but also to the Japanese people. The Japanese realized the need to diversify their suppliers of resources, which because of their dependence on foreign energy supplies was inescapable.⁴⁵ Japan's efforts to reduce its dependency on foreign energy by developing energy-saving technologies and improving infrastructure which increases efficiency, could not solve its energy problem fundamentally. As a nation which depends highly on foreign resources and trade, Japan had to concentrate its efforts to secure natural resources. Japan's economy was also too big to be confined within the U.S. bloc. Since Japan's economic structure relies on foreign trade and depends on

international stability, any regional conflict would be harmful to the Japanese economy.

The Japanese government felt freer to pursue a more active multilateral diplomacy after the United States had handed back Okinawa to the mainland in 1972. With the reversion of Okinawa, all pending issues from the aftermath of the war were resolved--except the intractable Northern Territories problem with the Soviet Union--and this reinforced the impression that Japan was standing at the beginning of a new age in its relationship with the rest of the world.

As a result, while, they tried to consolidate the relationship with the United States, Japan's leaders started to devise its own more active foreign and security policy. For the first time Japan departed radically from its position of aligning with US positions on major issues by adopting a pro-Arab stance in the 1973 oil crisis and by joining the West European countries in taking a more accommodating line on Arab demands. With the turning point of those events, Japan's leaders tried to diversify the country's foreign policy and tried to improve relations with as many countries as possible. It was called 'omni-directional diplomacy'(*zenhoi gaiko*). Japan eagerly tried to be involved in international organizations and forums to deal

with the economic problems of the Low Developed Countries(LDCs).⁴⁶ And Japan stepped up its aid program to the strategically important states, such as Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. In Asia, beyond its war reparations to neighboring countries, Japan had used its economic aid to secure natural resources and regional stability. Between 1978 and 1980, Japan more than doubled its annual Official Development Assistance(ODA) allocations, fulfilling a pledge made by Prime Minister Fukuda during his trip to Southeast Asian countries in 1977. Natural resources abundant countries, such as Indonesia and China, have been in the top rank of countries in receiving Japan's ODA.

Japan also started to develop more active military security measures. In October 1976 the National Defense Council under Prime Minister Miki, approved the National Defense Program Outline(NDPO) setting the basic policy for the defense buildup after the fourth plan. The NDPO prescribes the objective for possessing the assorted functions required for national defense, while emphasizing retaining a well-balanced posture in terms of organization and deployment. This includes a logistical support system, thereby maintaining a sufficient surveillance and warning posture in peacetime and the capability to cope efficiently with situations up to

limited and small scale aggression. Japan's defense capability since FY 1977 has been improved in accordance with the NDPO.⁴⁷ The NDPO gave great flexibility to Japan's defense planning by signaling two important policy changes. Firstly, the previous approach of planning to meet a specific threat was discarded in preference for a defense structure smoothly adapted to confront emergency situations. Secondly, the previous pattern of fixed build-up programs spanning a given period of time was to be scrapped and replaced with a more flexible system where decisions would be taken each fiscal year. This annual approach was short-lived, however.

Japan's military role expanded much in the November 1978 Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation by assuming that the SDF will be responsible for strategic defense, while the U.S. military would take responsibility for strategic offense in response to large scale aggression. However, Japan's government had to claim that it had no right to collective defense and that any US help was different from the security arrangement of NATO to meet public opposition. In 1981 the Japanese Foreign Minister actually had to resign after the Security Treaty was called an 'alliance' by Prime Minister Suzuki.⁴⁸

Moreover, when Prime Minister Suzuki reluctantly agreed to the

sharing of operational duties in the protection of sea-lanes around Japan, and when Prime Minister Nakasone expanded its sea-lane defense role to include some functions in blockading the straits around Japan⁴⁹, the concept of Japan's security and military capability expanded greatly. Japan's MSDF has participated in RIMPAC--mid-Pacific naval war games conducted in conjunction with the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand from 1980, and including South Korea after 1988. In 1981, for the first time, GSDF units held joint maneuvers with the U.S. Army in Japan and in Hawaii, and in May 1983 participated for the first time in a joint command-post exercise in the continental U.S. at Fort Ord, California. Moreover, Japan held the first domestic joint exercise involving GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in July 1981.⁵⁰

While, Japan consistently expanded its sphere of influence and military capability, it tried to keep its national strategy as long as possible. When the Miki Cabinet adopted the NDPO in 1976, it stated that defense spending should be kept within "one percent of GNP" as a guide line for this long-range program. Although some members of the government considered such a guide line unrealistic at that time, this rule was set as a kind of target for the time being in view of the need to indicate and explain

to the people the size of defense spending. Previous defense build-up programs had clearly set their time limit of five years, and noted the quantity of weapons to be procured and estimated the amount of funds needed. The economic confusion of 1976 resulting from the first Oil Crisis, made it difficult for the government to forecast the economic situation in the following five years and to estimate defense expenditures needed for that period. Based on this condition, the Miki Government gave the NDPO great flexibility, which thus, could be estimated by the year. In other aspects, it seemed that swelling defense spending made the people anxious about Japan turning into a major military power. Thus, the government needed to respond to this concern. While to the Defense Agency this one percent of GNP guaranteed a stable defense budget, to the people, it provided a safe guard. Although this rule was broken by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1987, it generally has been kept as an acceptable limit of defense spending among Japan's government and the Japanese public.

A number of ideas and concepts that had started to appear in Japan after the 1973-4 oil crisis were merged in the a report which marked a turning point in Japan's postwar foreign and security policy. Among them, Japan's most serious response to the changing international environment

emerged in 1980 with the Report on Comprehensive National Security. The report was compiled by a study group instituted by Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi, who had also set up other study groups to investigate Japan's economic relationships and the Pacific Basin Community idea. The report characterized the termination of clear American supremacy in both military and economic spheres in the 1970s as a most fundamental change and stated that U.S. military power was no longer able to provide its allies and friends with a complete security guarantee. According to the report, Japan intended to preach for a peaceful world while depending on others to do something to achieve it. The group suggested that the new situation required efforts on three levels: "efforts to turn the overall international environment into a favorable one; self-reliant efforts to cope with threats; and as intermediary efforts, efforts to create a favorable international environment within a limited scope while protecting security in solidarity with countries sharing the same ideals and interests."⁵¹ Although the term 'comprehensive security' is no longer in vogue, all Japanese governments since 1980 have based their responses on the analysis of the report and followed its recommendations with more or less vigor and success.

Two points in particular in the report have had a long-term

influence: its dismissal of omnidirectional diplomacy, and its recommendation that the country's national security policy be integrated into an overall framework. The Ohira cabinet abandoned the short-lived post-oil shock policy of omnidirectional diplomacy, which had never been credible and had only been criticized by Japan's Western allies as a mask for opportunism and the evasion of responsibility. As a signatory of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which the government always declared to be the basis of its security policy, Japan could not possibly conduct omnidirectional diplomacy and at the same time maintain equidistance from both superpowers. The 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, with China was clearly directed against the Soviet Union, and therefore Tokyo could no longer claim any shadow of doubt as to its position in the global rivalry between the superpowers. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. hostage crisis in Iran demanded a clear statement that Japan belong to the West if it were not to risk diplomatic isolation.

The other major point, the declaration that national defense should be an integral part of Japan's security in the broadest sense, led to the formulation of the term 'comprehensive security.' This was defined as a policy to protect Japan against all sorts of external threats (the report itself

also included countermeasures against earthquakes), through a combination of diplomacy, national defense, economic and other measures. The term thus freed Japan's national security from the straitjacket of the Security Treaty with the United States, allowing Japan to secure its external environment by other means, such as aid to strategically important countries, and transcending to some extent the sharp divide between the system of the Peace Constitution and the system of the Security Treaty.⁵²

Some Japanese criticized the concept of comprehensive security as being a smokescreen for increased military efforts, while others argued that it would divert attention from the necessity of increased military contribution. In any case, the concept of comprehensive security has been very useful excuse to avoid greater defense efforts under U.S. pressure on Japan. And it has been an excellent cause to persuade the Japanese for the need of military capabilities, too, because it made it easier to elevate military efforts to a more or less equal rank beside diplomacy and economic measures. On balance, the concept of the comprehensive security doctrine has contributed to expanding Japan's role in international politics through economic, political and military means.

Based on comprehensive security, Japan moved toward becoming

more actively involved in international politics in the 1980s. Starting with Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to the ASEAN countries in 1977, Japan began to take diplomatic initiatives to ensure international stability in Asia. Political and economic steps were taken to support the ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand, in the face of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Gradually expanding her diplomatic horizon beyond Asia, Japan began to gear economic assistance toward wider strategic considerations (Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt were among the first beneficiaries of this new policy) and to participate in the concerted political actions of the Western industrialized democracies, such as the boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow and trade sanctions against the Soviet Union over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁵³

Through the 1980s, under the strong pressure of the Reagan administration combined with the strong desires of Prime Minister Nakasone, Japan eagerly tried to improve its military capability based on the NDPO. Prime Minister Nakasone's efforts to increase its military capability resulted in accomplishment of the NDPO by 1990 and changing the National Defense Council into the National Security Council.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

Based on the principle of least armament, Japanese leaders have denounced massive armament and involvement in regional or global conflicts, yet, they have developed their own military forces slowly but surely.

Japanese defense capabilities since the First Defense Build-up Plan(1958-1960) have increased within the framework of the United States-Japan Security Treaty system. The first plan focused on building-up the Ground SDF in order fill the gap created by the rapid withdrawal of US ground forces after the Korean War. The second plan(1962-1966) set out to strengthen the Maritime and Air SDF to allow for a conventional response to aggression in a regional war. The third(1967-1971) and fourth(1972-1976) followed the same policy, introducing new weapons and modernizing the SDF.

In October 1976 the National Defense Council approved the 'National Defense Program Outline' setting the basic policy for the defense build-up after the fourth plan. The outline stipulated that the defense structure should possess various functions required for national defense, while retaining a

balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support. It aimed at building a basic defense capability which would make an effective response to 'small scale, limited aggression' possible. The 1986-1990 Mid-Term Defense Program and the new 1991-1995 Program are both based on the outline.

NDPO prescribes that Japan's defense capabilities are based on:

1. relying on US nuclear deterrence for countering nuclear threats;
2. cooperating with the United States in responding to large scale conventional threats and in naval operation;
3. deterring through its own resources any limited, small-scale aggression.⁵⁴

It is assumed that the SDF will be responsible for strategic defense, while the U.S. military takes responsibility for strategic offense in response to large scale aggression. This division of roles was spelled out in the November 1978 Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation.

In the 1980s Japan sought to steadily increase its defense spending and to modernize defense capabilities. Over the last decade the Japan Defense Agency(JDA) has enjoyed one of the fastest defense expenditure growth rates in the world, averaging 6.5 percent between 1980-1989. Defense expenditures for fiscal year 1993 are approximate at US \$45 billion, rising by around 3 percent over the 1991-5 Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan.

Military spending at this rate will be just below the one percent ceiling. Although the growth of defense expenditures is under review, the fact remains that Japan is alone among the G-7 industrialized nations in increasing its military spending. After the demise of the former Soviet Union, Japan's defense expenditures became the second highest in the world, and as the Japan's economy is expanding consistently, the size of Japan's defense expenditures will grow steadily.⁵⁵

Japan's military dominance is particularly telling in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's relative defense expenditures is substantial: five times that of Australia, three time that of North and South Korea combined, and almost 20 percent greater than China's.⁵⁶

The high absolute value of Japanese defense expenditures is reflected in the country's build-up of the Self Defense Forces' military capability. The GSDF now consists of 13 infantry divisions and two composite brigades, with an authorized personnel of 180,000(actual personnel 151,176).⁵⁷ It has 1,200 tanks soon to include 200 of Japanese developed Type-90 model and 930 armored vehicles. The strength of the MSDF is impressive. In size it is little smaller than that of China's navy, but when we consider quality, it is the most modernized navy in Asia. The 44,000 naval personnel operate

a fleet of 16 submarines and over 60 surface ships including 42 destroyers and 16 frigates. Not only does this represent one of the most modern navies in the world in terms of hull life, but in numbers it is nearly three times the size of the US Seventh Fleet whose strategic responsibility covers the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The MSDF's 100 P-3C anti-submarine warfare aircraft are four times the number of P-3Cs deployed by the US Seventh Fleet. More significant is the construction by Ishikawajima Harima of a 5,500 ton dock landing ship which has the potential for operating VSTOL aircraft. This could be viewed as an interim step towards the MSDF acquiring an aircraft carrier. In the mid-1980s, they expanded their sea defense zone from 200 to 1,000 nautical miles.

The ASDF possesses 46,000 personnel. The 130 F-4EJ Interceptors are in the process of modernization. These and other long range fighters including the advanced F-15EJ Eagle total about 340 planes. The ASDF also has some of the West's most advanced air defense systems including the Patriot SAM that proved so effective in the Gulf War. In addition there are eight Grumman E-2C Hawkeye early warning aircraft with a further five on order as of 1994. Furthermore, the new Mid-Term Defense Program(FY1991-1995) places higher emphasis on strengthening Japan's

capabilities of greater regional strategic importance to include more advanced command, control, communications and intelligence systems, an over the horizon radar system with 3,000 km detection distance, air refueling planes for E-3A's, and light aircraft carriers.

Although 273,801 authorized personnel for the SDF is a small number, compared to those of China, North and South Korea, the Japanese SDF's capabilities represent the most modern armed forces in East Asia.

C. FROM RENUNCIATION OF WAR POTENTIAL TO SENDING TROOPS OVERSEAS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

How is it possible for Japan to considerably expand its defense capability without amending its constitution which renounces war potential? The peace constitution comprises two main parts: the first pertaining to war renunciation and the second to the prohibition of 'offensive' war potential.

The Constitution has never been amended. Hence the existence of about 250,000 Japanese military personnel surely hints at something unconstitutional. In the Japanese manner, it is all matter of interpretation. Japan's official interpretation of Article 9 is that it retains the right of

national self defense under international law. But Article 9 states that Japan could neither wage war nor maintain an armed force, even for the purpose of self-defense.⁵⁸ For pragmatic purposes, attempts to overcome this constitutional paradox have led Japanese government officials to perform diplomatic gymnastics in the post war period. Efforts to justify the existence of Japan's armed forces have attempted to deflect attention from the Constitution, focusing instead on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which states that self-defense is a right of every signatory nation.

Between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War Japan possessed no armed forces. Thereafter, to replace Japan-based U.S. forces deployed in Korea the Americans encouraged the establishment of a 75,000 Japanese Police Reserve Force. This Police Reserve had evolved by April 1952 into the Japanese National Safety Force(NSF). Prime Minister Yoshida with Foreign Minister Ashida (who also acted as the safety minister) had to be intellectually nimble in response to awkward questions about his portfolio. Against opposition party attack, they maintained that war potential forbidden by Article 9 could be differentiated from "defense potential"; also that the NSF were not unconstitutional because they had no capability to wage modern warfare, and thus were not an offensive threat.⁵⁹ This definitional

dispute over defensive vs offensive capability represented the opening shots of a debate that has continued to rage.

As a starting point of this dispute, over time there has been a gradual, more militaristic interpretation of the Peace Constitution, which its ambiguity allows. In 1957 Japan's first Five Year Defense Build-up Plan was endorsed providing for the expansion and modernization of the Country's SDF. Later in 1976 greater flexibility was introduced through the publication of NDPO. This policy meant that the previous pattern of fixed build-up programs spanning a given period of time was to be scrapped and replaced with a more flexible system where decisions would be taken each fiscal year. In order to get approval of the opposition parties and persuade the general public, Prime Minister Miki adopted the policy of a one percent ceiling of GNP.

In 1987 Prime Minister Nakasone while allaying fears over the reincarnation of Japanese militarism conceded that for the Mid-Term Defense Program(1986-1990), the one percent threshold would be broken. Justifying this policy-break, he argued that while [the plan's raised expenditure] comes to 1.04 percent of GNP on a yearly basis, it is almost the same as one percent.⁶⁰

Japan participated in mine-sweeping operations with its MSDF's minesweepers after the Gulf War without amending its Constitution. Japan decided to participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations by passing the Japanese UN Peacekeeping Cooperation Law(PKO bill) in the Diet in June 1992. As a result of this decision, its GSDF has been participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia and Africa. This means that the PKO bill ended the ban on sending SDF troops abroad, which had been a key principle of Japan's defense policy. Although it has limitations, such as limiting deployments to missions requiring logistical and humanitarian support, the monitoring of elections, and providing aid in civil administration, this step means that Japan started to become more involved militarily in world politics. Its activities go beyond economic contributions, and now the future direction of Japan's defense policy is not up to its legal basis, but up to the interpretation of Japanese politicians, and public opinions.

Amidst the debates over sending the SDF abroad, Ichiro Ozawa, as secretary-general of the LDP and de facto author of the UN Peace Cooperation bill, insisted that SDF members participate without giving up their status as members of the military. Although the bill failed, he believed

that introducing it and forcing debate on the constitutionality of sending SDF personnel to cooperate with international peacekeeping efforts was in itself a political achievement.⁶¹

The defense policy of Japan has shifted first from an "absolute" renunciation of war capability to a strictly defensive defense, then to a more flexible defense, and last to dispatching the SDF abroad. Thus, it seems clear that Article 9 often has been used cynically and interpreted by the conservative, mainstream leadership to suit their political needs and their fundamental definition of Japanese national purposes. Interpretations have been political rather than legal judgements. That is possible because Japan's Supreme Court, whose judges are appointed by the Cabinet, has sidestepped every opportunity to interpret Article 9, declaring it a "political question."

III. THE KOREA ISSUE IN JAPAN'S COLD-WAR SECURITY POLICY

During the late 19th and the early 20th century, Korea's naive efforts to keep its sovereignty by attempting to play the various regional powers off against each other, without any indigenous ability to guarantee its security resulted in the loss of its national sovereignty to Japan in 1910 after Japan won consecutive wars against China(1895) and Czarist Russia(1904-1905). Japan's perception of Korea's role in its security is that Japan's security is threatened when the forces on the Asian continent are not constrained by a principle power restricting foreign expeditions and military conquest; and when the resistance of the Koreans collapses.⁶² Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule as a result of Japan's defeat in World War II by the Allied powers in 1945. These historical events not only set Korea's post-World War II foreign relations, but also severely influenced Koreans' feeling about foreigners. Koreans' strong distrust and animosity toward Japanese have been only the most intense manifestation of its total distrust of foreigners in general. This attitude, paradoxically, ended Korea's naivete in its foreign relations and strengthened the national identity of Koreans which developed into an important catalyst for South and North Korea's

nation building efforts. This feeling is best expressed by an old children's jump-rope chant:

Don't be cheated by Russians,
Don't rely on Americans,
The Japanese are rising again,
So, Koreans, be careful.⁶³

During the post-World War II period, the relationship between South Korea and Japan was severely constrained by the historical legacies of Japanese imperialism. The colonial experience did indeed breed animosities and hatred which continue to influence the perceptions and cognitive structures of Koreans today. This stereotype of misunderstanding has risen and fallen depending on the issues, such as history text books, apologies for wrongdoing of colonial rule, compensation for victims of the atomic bombs and comfort women, the Korean minority in Japan, and Kim Dae Jung kidnapping. This suggests that the major sources of tension between Korea and Japan are not simply attitudinal but historically structured and developed. It also points out that top priority should be given to a genuine "settlement" of the historical past for the sake of the future of the relationship between the two countries.

A. THE KOREAN WAR

The United States' deep involvement in East Asia in every aspect during the postwar period almost make it impossible for us to think about the security relationship between South Korea and Japan without considering U.S. policy toward them. U.S. policy in Asia right after the Second World War, focused on China as a stabilizing factor to check the reemergence of Japanese militarism. In line with this policy, U.S. interests in Korea right after World War II were to create a single, unified, democratic, independent state supporting the stability of Northeast Asia. As the confrontation with the USSR became obvious, however, U.S. policy shifted from China-centered to Japan-centered. The ascent of Mao Zedong and the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 gave a decisive impetus to form the 'containment policy' in Asia. As a result Japan's position changed from the former enemy to a newly important ally to the United States. The United States, as the occupying power in Japan, accepted and adopted as its own the Japanese conviction that the security and welfare of Japan itself depended on the security of Korea. Korea in the hands of a hostile nation or group of nations would menace the very survival of Japan.⁶⁴

US goals in Korea supported the Republic of Korea as a sole legitimate government partially for the sake of Japan, not only for the sake of South Korea itself. Between World War II and the Korean War, the U.S. military advised President Truman that "from the stand point of military security, the US has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea."⁶⁵ Thus, U.S. interests in South Korea were subjugated to the national interests of Japan. Nevertheless, the United States had to give considerable support including military organization, and large amount of equipment to strengthen the ROK's capability to resist a possible attack from the North and to develop it as a democratic stable state. Because America was leading the newly established United Nations, the security of the ROK was essential for the maintenance of the United States privileged position. However, U.S. support for South Korea was limited to a certain degree. The U.S. did not want to make South Korea too strong, thereby enabling it to invade North Korea under some hot-headed leaders. When the U.S. occupation forces in South Korea did withdraw from Korea they left only a few military advisers in late 1949. This U.S. policy was reflected in the address of Secretary of State, Dean Acheson in January 12, 1950, which stated that the defense perimeter of the United States in Asia included Japan

and the Philippines, but excluded Taiwan and South Korea. Therefore, from the U.S. point of view, South Korea's security up to the outbreak of the Korean War depended on the security of Japan.

The outbreak of war in Korea brought about an unanticipated intensification of U.S.-ROK military relations, once the Truman Administration decided to override the previously stated position of Acheson. That war, and the extension of U.S. protection over Korea, was partially a response to global anti-communist incentives. It also was a response, however, to American recognition that North Korea's aggression against South Korea represented an Asian corollary of the global communist Cold War threat. On October 1, 1953, South Korea and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, which Secretary of State Dulles said would prevent a renewal of communist aggressions in Korea. Earlier American treaties in the Pacific area (the ANZUS Treaty and the treaty with the Republic of Philippines) were designed primarily with the menace of a resurgent Japan in mind. Together with similar agreements with the Republic of China on Taiwan, Japan and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization(SEATO), the Korean treaty was intended to create a defense system to contain communism.⁶⁶

Because of the U.S. occupation authorities' responsibilities for Japan as of mid-1950, the United States was compelled to treat any threat arising in Korea from a vantage point with deep roots in Japan's geopolitics.⁶⁷ That sequence of events in Korea, with an eye on Korea's role in the still emerging Cold War, produced American decisions to reorient the purposes of the U.S. occupation of Japan. Instead of a punitive controlling of Japan, the United States embarked on a campaign to encourage a Japanese renaissance that might make it the Asian centerpiece of its regional Cold War efforts. As a result of this rethinking of Japan's strategic importance, U.S. occupation policy changed rapidly. The pace of ending the U.S. occupation of Japan was accelerated. Japan was encouraged to regain its economic prosperity for reasons which had shifted from post-war recovery to an early Cold War strategic rationale with a generic global focus, and which now developed a new and explicitly regional focus. Japan had to be domestically resilient enough to resist the strains of a war being fought in its back yard, and sufficiently autonomous to permit the United States to divert its attention from a quiescent issue (controlling Japan) to a more pressing issue. One of the prominent parts of this process of adaptation to a rapidly changing Cold War environment entailed U.S. occupation

leadership in the creation of a post war-Japan's version of armed-forces.⁶⁸

As a result of the Korean War, South Korea gained only a loose Defense Treaty from the United States, and it had to pay attention constantly to U.S. policies in order to seek firm U.S. commitments to the treaty. On the other hand, Japan recovered its sovereignty in 1951, earlier than it expected, got an explicit security guarantee from the United States, and had the 'heaven-given' opportunity for its economic recovery.

The Korean War influenced the relationships between South Korea and Japan in different ways. It was the Korean War which led South Koreans to realize the importance of Japan as a part of an alliance of necessity in coordinating its strategic posture against communist aggression.⁶⁹ But it was also the Korean War that aggravated the undertone of Koreans' suspicion of Japan. First of all, many Koreans began to suspect that Japan tried to find the solution to her security problem through the division of the Korean peninsula. Secondly, Koreans believed that the key to Japan's post-war economic success was largely related to the Korean War. Consequently, Koreans' stereotypes of Japan, which see Japan's success as coming at Korea's expense, have faded since the Korean War.⁷⁰ Conversely, while the Japanese started to realize the importance of South

Korea for her security from the communist threat, they still tend to regard Koreans as they did during the colonial era.

The Korean War strengthened South Korea's own version of security relations with the United States, however, the security of South Korea is still highly dependent on U.S. interests in the security of Japan. During the debate about the U.S. commitments to the Defense Treaty with South Korea, when asked if the ROK was necessary for the defense of the United States in the Pacific, General Ridgway replied: "Positively. Yes, Sir." He maintained that the ROK could contribute to the security of the United States in the event of general war or renewal of hostilities in Northeast Asia. If communist forces were to overrun the Korean Peninsula, they would directly and seriously threaten an area of vital strategic importance to the United States; namely, the offshore island chain in the Far East and, above all, the key element in the chain--the main Japanese islands.⁷¹

From the Japanese point of view, as long the United States handles well the stability of the Korean Peninsula, there is no reason for Japan to worry about threat from the Korean Peninsula. The only thing Japan had to do was to pursue its economic benefit from Korea, as it did vis-a-vis the United States. In sum, the Korean War made it clear that the U.S.-Japan

defense relationship and the U.S.-South Korea defense relationship had related--yet dramatically different--roots. And it made it clear that the security of South Korea was essential to Japan's security which was cornerstone of the United States interests in Asia.

B. JAPAN-ROK DIPLOMATIC NORMALIZATION

The negotiation of diplomatic normalization between South Korea and Japan started in 1951 and concluded in 1965. Urged by Washington which was eager to create a trilateral defense structure to facilitate its war efforts in Korea and to confront the communist bloc, the two nations embarked on a settlement process that was to take fourteen turbulent years before they could conclude a treaty. It might be right to say that until the early 1960s, Korean diplomacy was profoundly beyond the control of Koreans, who were in the United States' hands.⁷² Though Japan officially became an independent state in 1951, the United States had strongly influenced Japan's fate too during that period. Considering these conditions, it is not difficult for us to understand how strongly historical legacies influenced that negotiation process.

Then, what made it possible to conclude this treaty? In South Korea, Park Chung Hee came to power with the "most" developed groups on May 16, 1961. He had a strong feeling that the only way of building a genuinely independent nation depended on economic development.⁷³ Moreover, he had no alternative but to choose Japan's Meiji Revolution and Japan's economic assistance as the model of his nation-building scheme, and as the mean of achieving his economic goal. He knew well the real power of Japan. He was a graduate of the Japanese military academy, an officer in the Imperial Japanese army, obviously fluent in Japanese, and seemed to have no apparent grudge or contempt towards the Japanese compared to the position of President Syngman Rhee. In this regard, his position was significantly different from that of Syngman Rhee. Rhee maintained his power by appealing to the people's anti-Japanese and anti-communist feelings, and by showing his patriotism which was often expressed as an effort to unify his country. Rhee ruined the negotiations of diplomatic normalization between the two countries with his establishment of what became known as the "Rhee line" on January 18 1952. But the Park Chung Hee government, faced with the need to attract new sources of investment capital for his economic development plans, and with growing American

pressure to restore relations with Japan out of strategic considerations, decided to push ahead with normalization with Japan in the face of fierce domestic opposition.

In Japan, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato signaled the importance he attached to improving relations with Japan's immediate neighbor, South Korea. He made it clear that normalization with Korea was the beginning of Japan's Asian diplomacy. These point of views were strengthened by strategic understandings. In the post-war period, South Korea and Japan accepted America's assumptions about East Asian security as an inevitable concomitant of American power in world affairs. In the early 1960s, the United States was starting to be involved in the Cuba crisis and the Vietnam War. Under these circumstance, Japan had to be somewhat supportive of U.S. requests. Japan still faced the problem of constitutional limitation and the people's strong anti-military feelings on building up a war capability. Therefore, its logical policy was to build a closer association with its allies by showing a perceptive political regard for their political and economic interests. The policy adopted by Japan was that of proxy military force by which Japan concentrates on economic growth at home while offering generous and sophisticated involvement in their economic projects to deter

the communist threat. There could be little doubt that President Park also wanted to see the two countries coordinate their political and security interests through economic cooperation.

This compromise attracted heavy criticism in both countries.⁷⁴ The terms of normalization began to be condemned by many South Koreans as a national sellout. First of all, the Treaty of Normalization was not clear about Japan's recognition of the Republic of Korea as the sole legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. Secondly, Japan did not make a formal apology over its colonial rule, expressing only "regret" over the unfortunate period in the two countries' relations. These two issues, coupled with genuine fear of Japan, remain unresolved in the minds of Koreans and continue to haunt the relationship between the two countries. Thirdly, the Treaty was construed as a second Katsura-Taft agreement through which the United States shifted its burden of Korean security protection to Japan. These feelings in turn burst into outrage, eventually leading to nationwide demonstrations in the ROK against the South Korean-Japanese talks.

The Japanese opposition came from a different dimension. Whereas, the Korean opposition feared that Korean security might be sacrificed by the United States for the sake of Japan, the Japanese opposition was concerned

that Japan would be drawn by the Treaty into the East-West conflict. To be sure, from the beginning of the talks the Sato government believed that it was in the geopolitical interest of Japan to support South Korea against the communist threat of North Korea. But, at the same time, Japan did not want to be involved in the confrontational policy pursued by Korea and the United States.

As the talks concluded, Japan began to provide Korea with a total of \$800 million, of which \$200 million was in the form of public loans, \$300 million in grants, and \$300 million in commercial credits over a ten year period starting in 1966. This assistance became one of the contributors to South Korea's rapid economic development.

Since normalization, the economic interdependence deepened significantly. Japan became the largest supplier of Korean imports and the second largest outlet for its exports. Not only has Japan been Korea's most important trading partner, but also its most important source of foreign loans and investment capital, and technology.

To South Korea, the Treaty became one turning point of its foreign policy and economic development. From the end of World War II until that time, South Korea's security and foreign policy were almost fully dependent

on the United States. Also, economic development plans were guided by U.S. advisers who had focused on agricultural development. From that time South Koreans started to make efforts to get to know Japan, escaping from an unconditional animosity toward it. The Treaty became a starting point for South Korea to decide her foreign policy based on pragmatic positions. South Koreans adapted the Japanese model of economic development which emphasized export-oriented industries. This shift from strong objection to Japan, to learn from Japan, developed into more pragmatic "catch up to Japan" policy later. Also, the Treaty became the foundation of South Korea's foreign policy which started to shift from passive client state to more active equal partner in dealing with its main patron nation, the United States.

C. KOREA AS A FACTOR IN JAPAN'S SECURITY AFTER NORMALIZATION

President Nixon's enunciation of the Guam Doctrine in July 1969, resulted in the Korea clause on the security relationship between South Korea and Japan, and had significant political and military implications. The Nixon Doctrine called for a linkage between Japanese and South Korean

security, and, in November of that year, when Prime Minister Sato visited Washington for a summit talk with President Nixon, a phrase was inserted into the Nixon-Sato Communique stating that the security of the Republic of Korea was "essential to Japan's own security."⁷⁵

The Korea Clause was a culmination of a prolonged Japanese-American negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Although the United States recognized the residual rights of Japan in Okinawa, it continued to administer the islands after the Second World War: the islands were of crucial strategic value to the United States simply because of their location in the Western Pacific. In the late 1960s, the United States was prepared to accede to intense nationalistic feeling in Japan and give the islands back, but in turn it requested that Japan grant the United States the unrestricted right to use American bases in Okinawa for the defense of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.⁷⁶ The long negotiations ended with the Sato visit, when the two sides agreed on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 in return for the inclusion of the Korea Clause in the joint communique.

The practical meaning of the Korea clause was delineated by Prime Minister Sato in his speech at the National Press Club after the summit

meeting: if South Korea or Taiwan came under attack, Japan would regard it as a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan, and would take prompt and positive measures so that the United States could use its military bases and facilities within Japan (which would include Okinawa after 1972.) to meet the armed attack.⁷⁷ This Japanese commitment was necessary for the United States because, without it, U.S. ability to provide support for South Korea would be severely limited. As Kubo Takuya, chief of the Defense Bureau of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency, put it:

Only if there is a Mutual Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, and if the U.S. could use Japan, could the U.S. provide military support to Korea. Under such a situation, there will be no war on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the security of the Korean Peninsula is essential to Japan.⁷⁸

Another contributor to the Korea clause was the Vietnam War. Although South Korea dispatched more than two divisions to the Vietnam War, it failed to renegotiate the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty along NATO lines in order to replace a commitment to consult with each other about a proper response to another North Korean attack with a commitment for an automatic U.S. military response. South Korea earned a "small" amount of money (it was estimated at \$546 million from 1965 to 1970) from the Vietnam War. This was less than Japan and only a little more than

Taiwan--neither of which participated in the war. But South Korea gained some combat experience, and many companies gained experience and reputations especially in the construction business which became one of the most famous South Korean industries. While Japan recovered its whole sovereignty over Okinawa by just endorsing the Korea clause and reluctantly expressing its agreement with the U.S. position that the U.S. bases in Okinawa could be used for the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, the ROK worked must harder to reinforce U.S. respects for it.

President Nixon's unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 U.S. troops from South Korea in 1970, his negotiations with China without consulting with Japan, and his actions in the economic arena created the impression that the United States would no longer treat Japan as an ally and the interests of the United States no longer coincided with those of Japan. The Watergate affair and the 1973 oil crisis heightened uncertainty in Japan. As a result of those events, Japanese leaders groped to find an independent foreign and security policy. As former foreign minister Ohira told a television audience in January 1972, Japan wanted to get out of this military dependence on the United States and attain political independence in world affairs, just as Japan has done in the economic field.⁷⁹

Based on these analyses, Japan did speed up its efforts to diversify its resource dependence and to initiate talks with many communist countries including North Vietnam. Japanese efforts in foreign policy resulted in establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in September 1972.

As for the security issue, Japanese leaders could not overcome the barrier of Article 9 of the constitution. But in drawing up the fourth defense build up plan, covering the years 1972-1976, a significant step was taken to bolster Japan's defense capability, which aimed at the creation of an autonomous defense capacity. Japanese security relations with the United States were to be reversed: the Mutual Security Treaty was to supplement Japan's own autonomous defense capability rather than the other way around. Japan was to maintain an air and sea capacity sufficient to deal with any crises.⁸⁰ Whereas the third plan called for an expenditure of \$7.2 billion, the fourth plan required \$16.6 billion. Clearly these changes reflected the new U.S. strategy, but they also reflected Japanese doubts about U.S. intentions. many Japanese believed that Japan should bolster its defense capability for its own sake regardless of U.S. intentions.

This more independent foreign and security policy reflected a revision of the Korea clause. Foreign minister Fukuda Yoshio in Sato Government, was eager to rid Japan of the responsibility it had assumed in the Korea clause, which he viewed as not only unnecessary but also detrimental to Japanese interests. Its cancellation would remove Japan from the anticommunist structure. At the Japanese-American ministerial meeting held in September 1971 Fukuda advocated a revision of the Korea clause. In October, after Beijing was accepted as the official representative of China at the United Nations, Fukuda revealed his proposal at the September meeting. He told the Diet on May 16, 1972, that the Korea clause had in fact lost its validity because of the new, stabilized situation on the Korean Peninsula. Prime Minister Sato also expressed the same opinion at a press conference in Tokyo January 8 1972, after the summit meeting with President Nixon at San Clemente, saying that this particular expression is not necessarily valid in describing the situation today, adding that "a communique is not a treaty."⁸¹ The progress of talks between the two Koreas in the early 1970s, contributed to the revision of Japanese security perceptions of the Korean Peninsula, too.

The trend away from the "Cold War structure" accelerated after

Tanaka Kakuei succeeded Sato as Prime Minister in July 1972. Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio revealed his government's intention to redirect its Korea policy, saying that the peace and security of the entire Korean Peninsula rather than just South Korea was essential to Japan. His policy developed into saying that the Republic of Korea was not the only legal government in Korea on September 5 1972. Japanese eagerness to expand its sphere of influence in the Korean Peninsula by promoting friendly ties with North Korea contrasted sharply with the intense animosity between South Korea and Japan triggered by the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung from Tokyo in 1973 and the attempted assassination of President Park Chung Hee by a Korean resident of Japan in 1974.

In the spring of 1975, however, the international environment, particularly the collapse of Saigon and its security implications for East Asia, strongly encouraged South Korea and Japan to make necessary compromises to restore the relationship. The fall of Saigon, the increasing belligerence of North Korea, and the discovery of two North Korean tunnels under the DMZ awakened leaders of both countries to the necessity of shifting the relationship from a confrontational one to a more collaborative one. Seoul, faced with the increasing security threat and eager to obtain

Japanese support for economic development, took initiatives to make the compromises necessary to resolve the pending issues. Tokyo, also concerned about the same developments and eager to stabilize its relationship with Seoul, made concessions on economic sanctions. As a result of these compromises, economic and political relations were back on track in September of 1975 when Japan agreed to resume its economic cooperation beyond the terms provided in the normalization settlement. On this basis, economic and political ties between the two countries gained new momentum. The human rights issue triggered by the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping which made worse the relationship between South Korea and Japan, took only secondary priority compared to the security realignment against the communist threat. This became more apparent when the Carter administration announced the withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea and made the promotion of human rights the cornerstone of his foreign policy. As South Korea and the United States clashed over the issues of security commitments and human rights, the prospects for improving the relationship between South Korea and Japan steadily improved.

This good relationship was maintained until the wake of the assassination of President Park Chung Hee and new military power under

Chun came to power. The emergence of an "illegitimate" military government and its subsequent demand for a five year \$10 billion loan as compensation for the security burden South Korea shouldered for Japan strengthened Japanese contempt and prejudice. The military coup of December 12, 1979 which was described as a "mini-February 26, 1936 incident" of Japan revived among the Japanese public the feelings of arrogance and scorn of the sort that Fukuzawa had harbored in 1895. Conversely, the Japanese Education Minister's attempt to reinterpret Japanese imperialism evoked anger and protest from Korea and other Asian countries.

It was in this context that the leaders of the two countries sought to prevent the relationship from collapsing. In Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro called for a fundamental reorientation of Japanese foreign policy away from a passive economic position toward a more active political venture under the slogan of *sengo no kessan* (settlement with the post war period). Japan is the major Pacific ally of the United States. But under Prime Minister Nakasone's predecessor, Zenko Suzuki, Japanese-American relations turned sour because of trade frictions and American irritation over Japan's grudging defense effort. Prime Minister Nakasone tried to restore

this relations through convincing Americans that Japan was a loyal friend and a trustworthy ally, and that when times were difficult, Japan was prepared to take up a fair share of the common responsibility for world economic stability and the defense of the Western nations. He even said that Japan was an "unsinkable carrier" in the Western Pacific.⁸² Close and harmonious relations between Japan and South Korea are very much in Washington's interest. Therefore, Prime Minister Nakasone could add weight to his presentation by making better political and economic relations with South Korea in dealing with his strong partner, the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan. Prime Minister Nakasone visited South Korea for his first foreign visit just a week before going to Washington in January 1983. As a political venture, he was willing to associate with South Korea as an equal partner. It was the first time a Japanese prime minister had visited Seoul officially. And it was the first time a Japanese prime minister had defied the bureaucracy--the Foreign Ministry strongly urged Nakasone to cleave to tradition and visit Washington first-- to launch a major foreign policy initiative.⁸³ Nakasone's visit to Seoul paved the way for agreement on a US\$4 billion Japanese aid package, providing a dramatic solution to the acrimonious stalemate behind which lay the question -- never officially

acknowledged by Tokyo-- of whether Japan is indebted to South Korea for shouldering a heavy defense burden which contributes to Japan's security as well.

In South Korea, President Chun felt the need to maintain close relations with Tokyo, especially after the Soviet shootdown of KAL-007 in September 1983 and the Rangoon incident of the following month. By emphasizing the importance of burying the past in relations between the two countries, Chun returned Nakasone's visit in September 1984. Prime Minister Nakasone visited Seoul again during the 1986 Asian games which were held in Seoul. Washington welcomed this rapprochement between South Korea and Japan since cooperation between the two was critical for its own plans for containing the expansion of the Soviet power in the Pacific.⁸⁴ And though any open security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo was ruled out for some time to come, an improvement in political relations could only help to strengthen the third leg in the triangle formed by the separate security relations the United States maintains with both countries. These good relations among the United States, South Korea, and Japan lasted as long as the three "conservative" leaders of these countries were in power, which developed into a so-called the association of the three

leaders -- President of the United States, Reagan, President of South Korea, Chun, and Prime Minister of Japan, Nakasone.

On this occasion, South Korea and Japan tried to view each other with far more enthusiasm than they had at the height of their collaboration in the past. For the first time since normalization, the issue of an apology was taken seriously. When he received President Chun, Emperor Hirohito tried to strike a careful balance between Korean and Japanese sensitivities by saying that, "It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for a period in this century, and I believe that it should not be repeated."⁸⁵ This was taken very seriously by a progressive Japanese daily as the Emperor's apology, whereas it was criticized by South Korean newspapers as a deliberately terse and vague apology compared with the address of the West German President Weiszacker that was delivered on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of the World War II, in which he openly admitted once again the guilt of Nazi Germany.⁸⁶ In addition, the anti-Americanism which was strengthened by the Kwangju democratization movement developed into total distrust of foreign countries and influenced the relationships between South Korea and Japan automatically.

The domestic political developments after the ROK presidential election of December 1987 and the general elections of April 1988, and the successful hosting of the Olympic Games improved Japanese attitudes toward South Korea more than they had been in the 1970s and early 1980s. Under the leadership of President Roh Tae-woo, South Korea embarked upon a process of political democratization and economic liberalization. This movement produced a more promising environment for political, economic, and cultural exchanges, and narrowed potential differences over the historical legacies between the two countries. Japan was not only supportive of this change, but also was serious about striking a political settlement with the democratically elected South Korean government on the historical past, a fact which was enormously frustrating to most Japanese. In fact, extensive consultations were made between the two governments on the issue of the new Emperor's apology over the historical past when President Roh paid a visit to Japan in May 1990. At the state banquet, Emperor Akihito made a formal apology for the past saying that, "I think of the sufferings your people underwent during this unfortunate period, which was brought about by my country, and cannot help but feel the deepest regret."⁸⁷ This was soon followed by the Japanese government decision to phase out the

compulsory fingerprinting of Korean residents in Japan.

Although unsatisfactory reactions were inevitable in South Korea, the issues seemed settled more and more. The change of Japanese attitude toward Koreans after the Seoul Olympic Games also contributed to this maturing relationship between the two countries. Since normalization, the relationship began to shift from confrontation over the ghosts of the historical past to a relationship of mutual adjustment of national interests.

The Seoul Olympic Games, which saw the greatest number of participating countries since the Montreal Olympics in 1976, was a real turning point in South Korea in almost every aspect. It confirmed that South Korea won the competition with North Korea. Not only did it enhance South Korea's international position significantly, but it also gave her the best opportunity to improve relations with communist countries, especially with the Soviet Union under the new *Pukbang ChungChek* (Northern Politics). Since Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk speech in September 1988, which included a statement about the Soviet's desire to develop economic relations with South Korea, trade between South Korea and the Soviet Union had increased considerably. But South Korea questioned the workability of economic cooperation without a political relationship.⁸⁸ South Korea made clear that

the most serious obstacle toward more active economic cooperation was the absence of diplomatic normalization. Finally, Gorbachev agreed to accept South Korean demands and had a summit meeting with President Roh in San Francisco on June 5, 1990, which was followed by a joint communique in September which announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In December, President Roh paid a state visit to the Soviet Union for the first time as a president of South Korea. Also President Gorbachev visited Cheju-do in April 1991.

The reasons for this rapid rapprochement involve mostly the Soviet Union's need to learn about South Korea's development experience, to receive its aid, its desire to use a South Korea card in dealing with Japan, and South Korea's political purpose to open North Korea and its economic desire to find new markets. Though South Korea was in a self-imposed vacuum regarding communism and put this stance as its first priority in national policy, and had bitter experiences with the Soviet Union during the Korean War and the KAL 007 incident, the Russian threat has often been seen as a distant, almost second hand danger to many South Koreans.⁸⁹

Concurrent with these Russian developments, South Korea expressed its self-confidence and flexibility in foreign policy by announcing in

November 1990 that she would close ten window dressing-type small ROK embassies by 1992,⁹⁰ and expressed its desire to join the UN General Assembly whether North Korea opposed it or not. having lost its Soviet support network, North Korea had no choice except to follow South Korea in joining the United Nations simultaneously in September 1991.⁹¹

Japan, though it lost in its bid to host the Olympics in Nagoya, fully supported South Korea with the hopes that it would be helpful in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. But, as soon as the relationship between South Korea and the Soviet Union was revealed, Japan's position changed rapidly. There were two kinds of trends of thought in Japan; one is optimistic, the other is negative.⁹² Some were optimistic on the grounds that rapprochement between South Korea and the Soviet Union would contribute to the resolution of territorial disputes between Japan and the Soviet Union. Particularly, progressive intellectuals welcomed the rapprochement not only because it would provide a stabilizing factor in the Asia-Pacific region, but also because it would constitute the termination of the post-World War II system. In their eyes, the adversarial relationship between South Korea and the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union and the Soviet occupation of Japan's Northern Territories were two sides of the

same situation. Therefore, the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and the Soviet Union meant to them the possible Soviet return of the Kurile islands to Japan.⁹³

But others were concerned about the possible negative impact on Japan of the rapprochement. They were particularly concerned about the fact that an improvement of South Korean-Soviet relations, even if it did not have any explicit anti-Japan implications, might weaken Japan's position in its dealings with the Soviet Union on the issue of the Northern Territories. They firmly believed that it was the Soviet Union rather than Japan that was more interested in improving relations between the two countries. In order to overcome domestic economic difficulties, the Soviet Union was seen in a desperate situation to secure Japan's economic assistance. But because of the developments in South Korean-Soviet relations, it became difficult for Japan to avoid applying the principle of *seikei bunri* (seperating economics from politics) to the Soviet Union. In their eyes, the South Korean approach was viewed not only as a policy of driving a wedge between Japan and the Soviet Union, but also as a policy of bonding with the Soviet Union to contain Japan's influence in East Asia.

To Japanese government officials, the summit meeting between Roh and Gorbachev was received as a shock not only because they did not expect such a sudden breakthrough in Seoul-Moscow relations, but also because they were not consulted about, or informed of, the meetings in advance. Japanese political leaders began to feel upstaged by South Korea in dealing with Moscow. It was in such a context that Japan began to play the North Korean card in countering South Korean diplomatic moves.⁹⁴

When the Japanese government was considering upgrading ties with Seoul in 1989, it was exploring the chances of a diplomatic breakthrough with Pyongyang. Prime Minister Takeshita expressed Japan's interest in having normalization talks with North Korea on March 20 by calling North Korea by its official title. But it was immediately after the Roh-Gorbachev meeting of June 5, 1990 that the Japanese government expressed publicly its more concrete official position concerning Japanese-North Korean diplomatic talks. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu made it clear that his government would make contact with North Korea without any precondition attached, and would help facilitate the proposed trip to Pyongyang by the LDP delegation headed by Shin Kanemaru in order to make it materialize as soon as possible.⁹⁵ Kanemaru visited Pyongyang in September 1990 as the

representative of the LDP and expressed his eagerness to normalize relationship with Pyongyang by voicing his support for an apology for Japan's past behavior and compensation in favor of North Korea. After a series of discussions, the Japanese delegation issued a joint declaration with the Korea Worker's Party (actually North Korea's official representative) on September 28, 1990. In the eight-point declaration, the parties urged Japan to apologize "for the unhappiness and suffering caused to the Korean people during the 36 years of colonial rule." They agreed that Japan should compensate North Korea not only for the damage caused during colonial rule but also for the "losses suffered by the Korean people in the 45 years" since the end of the World War II. The declaration stipulated that delegations would urge their respective governments to initiate diplomatic talks in November 1990, to work toward establishing diplomatic ties as soon as possible, and called for Japan and North Korea to set up satellite communications links and inaugurate direct flights between the two countries.⁹⁶ He also informed North Korean leaders that Japan would recognize that "there is only one Korea." As expected, North Korea responded to his initiatives enthusiastically, agreeing to release the two Japanese seamen, and subsequently invited the LDP to attend the 45th

anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers' Party. The LDP sent Mr. Ozawa, the Secretary General of the Party.⁹⁷

South Korean reaction was that, in case Japan provided massive compensation and economic assistance to North Korea, it would have not only a negative impact upon the inter-Korea talks, but also would make it more difficult for the realization of peaceful reunification of Korea. Almost automatically, the rapprochement came to be suspected as a reflection of Japan's two-Korea policy which intended to prolong Korean division. In fact, many Japanese have harbored doubts about the desirability of the two Koreas becoming one, though Tokyo and most Japanese political leaders say they support that goal. This duality, and Korean suspicions about Japanese intentions, were crystallized in the fall of 1990 when a well-known author and TV personality, Tanemura Kenichi, reportedly said, "An all-out invasion of Japan by Korea is inevitable if Korea is unified... therefore it is in Japan's best interest to help North Korea economically so the Korean Peninsula remains divided as now."⁹⁸ This comment caused controversy in South Korea and denials by Tanemura, but it symbolized the suspicions that exist on both sides.

Fortunately, however, mutual suspicion was eased by the more matured attitudes of each side. South Koreans believed that there was a strong possibility that the rapprochement between Japan and North Korea might serve to resolve the North Korean problem and it would be helpful to reduce "the unification bill". Therefore, in the long run, the rapprochement may benefit South Korea. This feeling is reinforced by Japan's sensitivity to both U.S desires that Tokyo not undermine Seoul and more importantly, Tokyo's anxiety about North Korea's nuclear potential.

Since normalization, the relationship between South Korea and Japan has shifted from confrontation over the ghosts of the historical past to a relationship of mutual adjustment of national interests. In security terms, historically Japanese have felt insecurity not about Koreans themselves, but about the possibility the Korean Peninsula could come under the control of a powerful enemy. During the Cold War era the Japanese security perception of the Korean Peninsula evolved into more pragmatic terms to meet its own national interests. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, Japan had tried not to be involved Cold War politics and narrowed its national interest to economic development. Thus, as long as the United States was responsible for South Korea's defense from the communist threat, Japan had

no need to support South Korea strongly. But, as the United States' commitments lessened in the Korean Peninsula and as the threats from the communists were strengthened, Japan expressed its support for South Korea. Since the early 1970s, Japan started to implement a more autonomous foreign and security policy resulting from the perceived declining credibility of U.S. superiority, and the detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This policy shift led to increased Japanese contacts with North Korea which was criticized by South Koreans as equidistance diplomacy. Following the turning point of the Seoul Olympics, Japanese security perceptions of the Korean Peninsula changed fundamentally. While they did not see a significant security threat arising from a renewed Korean war, the Japanese started to feel security threats from Koreans themselves. As early as the early 1970s, some South Korean industries such as construction and shipbuilding, became major competitors of Japanese industries in trade markets. This trend expanded rapidly to other industries(automobile and electronics). Moreover, South Korea's Northern Politics was far ahead of the Japanese in dealing with the Soviet Union and east European countries.

In sum, it seems that Japanese started to feel that South Korea was a competitor rather than the country which needs Japanese help, like the U.S. has felt about Japan since the late 1960s.

IV. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

A. THE CHANGES OF WORLD CIRCUMSTANCES

The collapse of the Soviet Union signalled the end of the Cold War, the end of the superpower rivalry for power and influence, the end of the ideological conflict between Capitalism and Communism, and above all, the end of bipolarity in world politics. As a result of this change, "complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability" now best describe the post-Cold War world politics.⁹⁹

Generally speaking, there are two different views about the prospects for peace and stability in the post-Cold War world. The first is put forward by the realist school of international relations. They are arguing that the superpower rivalry of the Cold War years played a unique, stabilizing role by forestalling regional conflict and inter-state rivalry. With the end of the East-West confrontation, these forces will now be free to play themselves out.¹⁰⁰

In contrast, the second view postulates a relatively benign era in the offing. It points to the growing trend towards economic interdependence as a force for political stability and holds out the hope that politico-economic arrangements will ultimately supersede politico-strategic considerations as

the rationale for security regimes.¹⁰¹

If we regard "ideological confrontation, superpower rivalry, and priority of military issues over other factors in world politics," as the major forces which had ruled the Cold War politics, what forces will influence the post-Cold War world politics? According to John Lewis Gaddis, these will be the forces of integration and fragmentation. The forces of integration-- economic, technological and political-- are "breaking down barriers that have historically separated nations and peoples in such diverse areas as politics, economics, religion, technology and culture."¹⁰² At the same time, however, forces of fragmentation or disintegration are also active in the form of nationalism, religion, ethnicity and language.¹⁰³

B. OVERALL IMPACT ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Based on Gaddis' argument, the positive factors to the stability and peace of the Asia-Pacific region are as follows: the ascendancy of geoeconomics over geopolitics, growing interdependence among nation states, and expanding democracy. The economic inefficiency of the Soviet Union is one of the key factors which led to the withdrawal of it from the superpower competition and the end of the Cold War. The economic success

of the NICs and Japan has not only enhanced their international stature, but has also shifted the regional balance of power in their favor. Put it this way, economic strength rather than military capability, a country's GNP and per capita income rather than the number of nuclear missiles and men under arms, have turned out to be the key determinants of a country's overall standing in the community of nations. Economic interests are surely one of the key factors which contributed to turning former enemies(e.g. China and Indonesia, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan) into friends. As a result of these facts, Asian nations seem to realize that, as Paul Kennedy has argued, the countries which are closed to outside influences inevitably fall behind the countries open to such influences.¹⁰⁴ Further in today's interdependent world, no country can afford to isolate itself from the rest of the world for very long. All countries have come to depend for their own prosperity upon the prosperity of others to a greater extent than the past.¹⁰⁵ In line with this, all countries in the Asia-Pacific-- from India to Vietnam and from North Korea to Cambodia-- are trying to develop their economy like the NICs. Thus, geoeconomics has come to outweigh, even eclipse, geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region.

The second trend of development is that transnational actors, such as multinational corporations and global trade agreements such as the GATT, pose a bigger challenge to the sovereignty of nation-states than any other institutions. This is so because the problems of economic development, environmental safety and national security can no longer be resolved at the nation-state level but only through cooperation with other states at the regional and global levels. The revolution of communications and information technology has helped to establish 'people-to-people and organization-to-organization' linkages that bypass the state, circumscribe its areas of direct control, and weaken its role in international relations. Therefore, the possibility of evolving security dilemmas between nation-states caused by wrong information decreased significantly.¹⁰⁶ Following this movement, Asian states are moving toward the development of an APEC that would be like the EC and NAFTA. APEC member nations agreed to establish a free trade area by 2010(industrialized countries), and 2020(developing countries).¹⁰⁷

The third trend of change is the expanding wave of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region. Rapid economic and technological development in East Asia laid the economic foundation for democracy by the late 1980s.

Confronted with new demands for political reform and democracy from their publics, the ruling elites of Taiwan, Singapore, the Philippines, and South Korea have been forced to undertake democratic reforms. Everywhere in Asia--from Seoul to Dacca--the younger generation, emboldened by the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in the former Soviet bloc, has been in the forefront of political, and economic, and social reform.

As a result of the end of bipolarity, there are also new threats to peace and security in the region. The United States may be the sole superpower of the world after the Soviet Union's disintegration, but the significance of its pre-eminent status has diminished. Its capacity to be a 'globo-cop' is in question as its economic capability and its willingness wane. As a result of diminishing U.S. role in security terms in Asia, the fear of a potential power vacuum has arisen, and this fear has developed into the question of which country will fill the vacuum. While Asian countries fear China's emergence as the sole strategic hegemon in the region in the long-run, and while they regard Japan similarly in economic terms, they are worrying about increased confusion in the post-Cold War world system.

The possibility of growing rivalry for regional supremacy among and between neighboring countries, especially between China, India, and Japan,

increases the potential for instability in the Asia-Pacific region. China and Japan, while they need each other for their economic development, have often expressed their worries about each other's increasing military capability, especially about their naval capability. Small states compared to China, India, and Japan, also, are moving toward increasing their military capability to defend their own national interests for themselves.

Economic competition, with a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, also has contributed to instability in the region. The disputes over the Spratly Islands among the concerned countries are actually induced by the competition over the control over energy producing resources. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the post-Cold War era poses another serious challenge to the region's peace and stability. While China and India have developed their nuclear weaponry capability to be included in the superpower status, Pakistan and North Korea are trying to develop their nuclear weapons in order seek a security guarantee from adversary states. How North Korea's nuclear issue is solved may significantly influence future strategic uncertainty in the region.

Asia also can not escape from the type of ethno-religious conflicts experienced in the Bosnian, Somalian, and Rwandan conflicts. There is

significant concern that the separatist aspirations of Kashmir in India, Sind in Pakistan, Tibet and Xinjiang in China, and East Timor in Indonesia are now bound to be exacerbated.

In sum, the end of the Cold War caused Asian nations to build strong nation states which can be self-reliant regarding their security concerns. To achieve this goal, they are focusing national energy on developing their economies by adopting the experiences of Japan and NICs as their models.

C. THE RISE OF JAPAN AS A POST-COLD WAR POWER

Japan's emergence as an economic superpower is one of the key features of the post-Cold War era along with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. One of the most obvious indicators to show Japan's economic performance is the changing value of Yen. The exchange rate of Yen against the U.S. Dollar shifted from 360 to 1 in 1970 to 100 in 1994. Japan's GNP surpassed that of Italy in 1966, England in 1967, France in 1969, and Germany in 1969. Japan's GDP jumped from 8.4 percent in 1960 and 20.2 percent in 1970 to 60 percent of the United States' figure in 1991.¹⁰⁸ Japan is the biggest creditor country, with about \$400 billion of net credit at the end of 1992. The trade surplus of Japan exceeded \$130 billion in 1992,

while the United States has come to have the world's largest trade deficit, \$96 billion in that year.¹⁰⁹ The United States trade deficit with Japan exceeded \$59 billion in 1993. Japan has surely emerged as the second largest economy following the United States in the post-Cold War world.

Region	Export	Import	Balance
U.S.	95.7	52.2	43.5
EC	62.4	31.2	31.2
Middle East	15.2	29.2	-14.0
S.E. Asia	104.3	57.5	46.8
L. America	15.8	8.7	7.1
C.P.E.	14.5	21.2	-6.6
Africa	5.0	1.7	3.3
Total	339.6	233.0	106.6

Table 1. Japan's merchandise Trade by Area(1992) (US \$ billion)
C.P.E. Centrally Planned Economy, such as China and North Korea.
Source: Japan Tarrif Association, The Summary Report:Trade of Japan.¹¹⁰

N.Ame	L.Ame	Asia	M.E	E.U	Africa	Ocean	Total
169.5	46.5	59.8	4.8	75	6.8	23.7	386.6

Table 2. Japan's Direct Overseas Investment by Region(April 1981-March 1993), (US\$ billion), Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan.¹¹¹

Japan not only increased the size of its economy, but also expanded its trade boundaries. There is almost no global region which Japan's trade

does not reach. As Table 1 and 2 show, Japan's economy is more deeply involved in the world economy than any other country.

In addition to its vast size and expanded trade boundaries, Japan is outstanding in technological performance, too. The ratio of Japan's technology exports to technology imports (actually, the ratio of value of licensing fees and royalties associated with technology exports and imports) has increased from 39.4 percent in fiscal 1975 to 137.8 percent in fiscal 1989.¹¹² The U.S. national Science Foundation reported in 1988 that Japanese firms accounted for the largest single share of foreign-origin U.S. patents. Moreover, Japanese-origin U.S. patents were cited more than proportionately in other patent applications, an indicator of their high quality.¹¹³ Other indicators of technological performance also suggest considerable Japanese strength. The rate of adoption and intensity of utilization of advanced manufacturing technologies (including robotics, computer-integrated manufacturing workcells, and flexible manufacturing systems) in Japanese manufacturing both exceed the corresponding levels in U.S. manufacturing.¹¹⁴ Kim Clark, Takahiro Fujimoto, and others have documented the ability of Japanese automotive firms to manufacture one car and to bring new models to market more rapidly than U.S. auto firms.¹¹⁵

Japan's economic status in Northeast Asia is outstanding. Japan is the sole Asian state in the G-7 club. Japan's economy comprised 70.9 percent of the entire Asian GNP in 1991. Japan's GDP was five times bigger than that of China and South Korea combined in 1992.¹¹⁶ Japan ranks first and second in imports and exports respectively as South Korea's trading partner. It ranks second as China's import and export partner in 1991. Japan also has assumed a major role in foreign aid to Asia, replacing America in the 1970s. Internationally Japan has intensified its foreign aid to Asia.¹¹⁷ After the Plaza Accord in 1985, Japan became the largest investor in Asia.

Japan's political status has increased considerably from the position of the late 1940s, largely due to the success of its economic development and foreign aid policy. Japan supports 12.5 percent of the United Nations general expenditure in 1992 (The United States' share is 25 percent). Japan's overriding economic presence reached the phase of making feasible a Yen Bloc, which reminds Asians of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the prewar period. At present, the advent of a Yen Bloc looks far from imminent, subordinated to the dollar in Asia.¹¹⁸ Nonetheless, several factors indicate this direction: an increasing volume of intra-regional trade, the Yen's prevailing financial status in the region, and the

internationalization of Japanese finance. It is analogous to the Japanese term "flying geese," with Japan as the leading goose. Were it come true, a Yen Bloc would give Japan structural power to affect the monetary and financial system in the region, which will assume political implications.

In military terms, Japan also emerged as a significant player in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's defense expenditure has become the second largest in the world as the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the high value of the Yen. Although the Japanese SDF's size is much smaller than that of the military in China, North Korea, and even South Korea, its capability is estimated as the most modern military in Asia. When we consider navies only, the Japanese Maritime SDF is surely more powerful than that of China.¹¹⁹

V. PROSPECTS FOR JAPAN'S POST-COLD WAR SECURITY POLICY

As international circumstances and Japan's national interests have changed, Japanese debates over defense policy have evolved from an absolute renunciation of military capability, to offensive vs defensive questions, and to denying dispatch of its SDF abroad vs dispatching it. Now, in the post-Cold War era, there might be many factors which justify Japan's more active role beyond its economic role in world politics. Japan opened its door to participate with military capability in international relations by dispatching its SDF to the Gulf and Cambodia under the auspice of the UN.

During the Cold War era, despite the United States pressing Japan to increase its military capability, few East Asian countries worried about Japanese militarization under the U.S-Japan security treaty. But the end of the Cold War made many countries in the region concerned about Japan's future direction. Moreover, Japan's emergence as an economic superpower with the most advanced technology, including military technology, heightened concerns about Japan's intentions.

A. CONDITIONS

1. Strategic Factors

a. Japan-U.S. Relations

Japanese postwar security perceptions have developed basically within the scheme of the Yoshida Doctrine-- depending on the U.S. for its external security, and pursuing its economic growth. This strategy made Japanese believe that their security mainly derives from economic sources rather than military sources. Because of this Japanese position, there have been significant differences in the two nations' view of the threats facing Japan and how they should be coped with strategically.

Earlier in the postwar period, Japan followed the U.S. perception of security issues without much conflict. The United States had enough military superiority to deal with any threats, and a well-defined role in the Western Pacific region as a self-appointed guarantor of the stability, which meshed very well with Japan's preference for its benefactor to assume such duties.¹²⁰ The designation by the United States of the Soviet Union as the major external power threatening the peace and stability of the region did not bother the Japanese, who tended to dislike and distrust the Soviets for historical reasons. Besides, from a Japanese point of view the Soviets were

not a direct threat in Asia, presumably because of the steadfast U.S. involvement in the region, so Japan discreetly followed Washington's definition of the threat. Some Japanese had doubts about the U.S. emphasis on China as an instrument of Soviet-sponsored threats, but most decided it was prudent to accept that interpretation as well. The Japanese sensed a remote danger in regard to neighboring North Korea, but even then the threat was not a direct danger to Japan so much as to South Korea, which served as something of a buffer state for Japan. Thus, the Japanese did not perceive a serious threat to them from any direction but were willing to acknowledge the existence of an overall threat to the Western alliance, of which they were anxious to become an integral part of because of the enormous economic benefits and the defense shield that would be provided by the United States.¹²¹

Declining U.S. credibility resulting from the Vietnam War and the Nixon Doctrine, combined with its strong pressure on Japan to share defense burdens, Japan's resource vulnerability acknowledged by the two oil crises, and the decisive buildup of the Soviets' navy in the late 1970s and the early 1980s in the Western Pacific, forced Japanese to draw its own security picture escaping from the complete U.S. security umbrella.

Japanese responded to those threats through their concept of "comprehensive security." During the Summer of 1980, a private advisory body established by Prime Minister Ohira released in English its *Report on Comprehensive National Security*. The authors of this report explained the political, economic, and military basis for Japan's stake in international security and argued that Japan could best bear its proper share of mutual burdens by becoming more active on all three fronts, but that Japan should emphasize its economic skills and minimize its military contribution. Further, because it was restrained by legal and moral limitations, Japan should play only a supportive role militarily within very narrow definitions.¹²² This privately produced proposal was rapidly incorporated into Tokyo's agenda by an October announcement that the government would create an official council by year's end to study comprehensively the relationship between defense and a wide range of economic issues that affected Japan's national security, broadly defined.

Then, what is the meaning of Comprehensive Security? When the debate over comprehensive security was engaged, Prime Minister Ohira told the LDP officials that "the United States is no longer a superpower but has become one of the powers, and the era has passed when one can depend

on the United States for everything."¹²³ Thus, the very meaning of Comprehensive Security is that Japan will take a more active role in international politics for both its security and world peace with all means possible whether they are economic, military, or political. This Japanese strategy, in terms of foreign policy, was elaborated into Ohira's notion of a Pacific Basin economic community as the basis for a forward-looking diplomatic agenda for the 1980s, and has developed into its active foreign involvement by means of prime ministers' visits, and economic assistance to those countries which have strategic importance for Japanese national security.

While Japan was opposed to American pressure to increase Japan's military capability to a scale large enough to meet the Soviet Union's military threat to the region, it started to develop its military capability so that it could meet its narrowly defined national interests, such as defending Japan from conventional threats, not from the threats of that the United States perceived-- namely the threat to regional SLOCs.

Although Japan adopted a more active policy under the name of Comprehensive Security in dealing with foreign and security policies, Japan did not deviate much from the Yoshida Doctrine. Comprehensive security

has become a rationale for Japan to rely on the United States to shore up the most difficult portions of Japan's broad-based security, while Tokyo copes very cautiously with other elements.¹²⁴ Tokyo's efforts at coping with these elements have been overwhelmingly economic, focusing on the positive geopolitical atmospherics that can be achieved through trade and investment. This accounts for Japan's extreme sensitivity to any signs that Japan's economic activities abroad are engendering frictions.¹²⁵ Tokyo arduously pursues harmony in these relationships, fearing that any severe disruptions would undermine the comprehensiveness of Japan's security in ways that might compel it to invoke the less benign portions of its security doctrine. Although Japan under Prime Minister Nakasone strengthened its military capability in order to cope with growing military threats from the Soviet Union's large scale navy buildup, it did not go far beyond the economic centered comprehensive security concept. This tells us that the priority of Japanese security perceptions focuses on its economic sources rather than a military threat. In line with this, through the Cold War era, although Japan regarded the Soviet Union as a major military threat, Japan did not feel it so much as the United States did. This Japanese behavior resulted from its narrowly defined threat perception strengthened by its

economic success which induced the conflicts with the United States over the issues of being a "free rider," and "burden sharing." Conversely, the heightened criticism from the United States over Japanese "free rider" behavior that started from as early as the early 1970s, made the Japanese doubt that the main source of the economic threat was the United States.

The end of the Cold War had a different influence on threat perceptions for both Japan and the United States. The United States no longer considers Russia a threat, and envisions that it would have a long time to prepare for any new threat to arise which would be comparable to that of the former Soviet Union.¹²⁶ In general, Japan also feels much less anxiety about the threat of the former Soviet Union, now Russia. However, while the United States seems largely prepared to view the Cold War as history, especially in terms of a U.S.-USSR conflict, Japan still clutches at its peculiar remnant of the Cold War. Part of Japan's rationale has to do with its territorial claims, but at deeper level there seems to be residual Russo-Japanese distrust, which does not permit Japan's leaders to put the Cold War into a historical file and walk away from it.¹²⁷

In terms of economic security, the end of the Cold War strengthened Japanese feeling that they had been in the right position which

emphasized economic and political means rather than military means in dealing with security issues, and, therefore that the United States has become the main source of a kind of threat to Japan. During the Cold War era, U.S. pressure on Japan focused on increasing Japanese defense expenditure to share the burden of containing the Soviet Union. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States lost not only its cause to press Japan on burden sharing, but also its reason to stay in Japan as a security guarantor against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States starts to feel new 'threats' from Japan in both economic and military terms. As a result, the United States has stepped up its pressure on Japan to cope with economic issues using its power, while checking Japanese emergence as a military superpower with various means. Despite persistent and growing economic conflicts between Japan and the United States, there are various reasons they need each other to cope with the post-Cold War uncertainties.

Now, as a result of the end of the confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States is no longer urging Japan to bear more of a defense burden, and is doing somewhat less in the Pacific region. The United States is signaling that the choice about taking a more active military

role is basically up to Japan. In the short term, the United States is asking Japan to do more, as in the case of the Gulf War. But Washington is also wary about letting Japan fill any new vacuum, especially as other Asians warn about their worries over Japanese militarism. Official American policy is to move to a more flexible and thinly spread force in the Pacific which uses smaller facilities around East Asia, and not to withdraw entirely.¹²⁸

In line with this, according to Olsen, American officials wanted to perpetuate the U.S. role in Japan because of: (1) the utility of American bases in Japan for U.S. strategy; (2) the economic and political leverage that Japanese dependence upon the United States created for Washington; (3) the financial and technological roles Japan could play as an 'ally' of sorts; (4) the potential Japan possesses to become a more meaningful security partner; and (5) recognition that the anxieties of Japan's neighbors might be warranted and, therefore, it might be better to keep an American leash on Japanese potentials.¹²⁹ In general, the United States' stake in the Asia Pacific region has grown consistently since the end of World War II, and the size of the trade with its Asian partners surpassed that of European partners in 1985. In January 1992, President George Bush, in a news conference during his visit to the Asian Pacific region, emphasized that the

United States is a "Pacific power," and he asserted that "we are going to stay involved in the Pacific." ¹³⁰ The Clinton Administration's active participation in the APEC meetings in Seattle and Jakarta tells us that the United States stake in Asia is now almost parallel to that of Europe. The United States seems to worry about the rise of any 'hegemonic power' hostile to the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This includes Japanese hegemony or Chinese hegemony, and it is especially concerned about a power combination of the two countries. Thus, the United States has no reason to withdraw its military from Japan. Further, the United States may try to utilize conflicts between and among neighboring countries around Japan in order to support its objective of staying in Japan.

Again, according to Olsen, Japan also wants to perpetuate the U.S. role because it is: (1) economically beneficial; (2) militarily beneficial by meshing Japan into a global security network without obligating Tokyo to do anything other than to help defend Japan; and (3) politically beneficial by minimizing the anxieties of Japan's neighbours who were (and are) concerned about what Japan might do if it were not constrained by linkage to the United States. Therefore, Japan has no reason to increase its military capability to the degree which makes the United States and neighbouring

countries in Asia worry about its intentions in relations with the United States. However, Japan probably shall increase its military capability to the degree which satisfies the United States demands and increase its share of the expense of maintaining United States forces in Japan.

b. Japan-Russia Relations

Japan's relations with Russia during the twentieth century, have been marked by animosity, rivalry, mutual suspicion, conflict and disputes.

As Stuart Harris has noted :

The animosity stemmed from the competition for power and influence in North East Asia at the turn of the century that led to the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese invasion of the Soviet Far East in 1918-22, the battle on the Soviet borders in 1930s, the link with Nazi Germany in the Germany-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, and the events of W.W II.¹³¹

The legacy of mistrust, suspicion and frosty relations not only survived the end of the World War II but intensified during the Cold War period because of the Soviet's attitude toward Japanese prisoners of war, and its occupation of the Southern Kurile Islands, which the Japanese consider to be their territories.

During the Cold War, the resolution of the territorial dispute was made difficult by a combination of diplomatic, strategic, and domestic-

political factors. For one thing, the security considerations and political alliances of the Cold War precluded the possibilities of a softening of their respective positions on the territorial dispute. Under Article 9 of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 19 October 1956, which restored their diplomatic relations, the Soviet Union agreed to return two of the four Northern Territories, the Habomai Islands and Shikotan, after the conclusion of a Moscow-Tokyo peace treaty. However, American influence over Japanese policy towards the Soviet Union was an important factor in the failure to reach an agreement over a peace treaty in 1956.¹³² From Washington's perspective, Japanese concessions on the territorial dispute or the conclusion of a Moscow-Tokyo peace treaty would have seriously undermined the US-Japanese Security Alliance. The Kurile dispute provided both the conservatives in the governing LDP and successive U.S. administrations a reason and a cause to gain Japanese public support for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and retain substantial U.S. military presence in the area. This was required because of the pacifism and anti-military tendency of the postwar Japanese people. As Edward Olsen realistically put it: if the islands dispute had not existed the United States would have had to invent the issue. The same could be said of the Japanese government.¹³³

During the Cold War, the territorial dispute became a symbol of the Japanese Cold War. It almost made it impossible for Japan and the Soviet Union to cooperate in developing the Soviet Far East, although there have been strong economic common interests. The cold war between Japan and the Soviet Union was at height when Prime Minister Nakasone stated that Japan would serve as an unsinkable carrier for American forces in the Pacific during his visit to Washington in 1983.

When the Cold War was in its last phase, although Moscow's strong desire to develop its Far East through cooperating with East Asia's advanced countries forced the Soviet Union to normalize its diplomatic relations with South Korea and to improve its relations with China, it failed to achieve its ultimate goal-- large scale economic aid from Japan in exchange for returning the Northern Territories. Japan and the Soviet Union(Russia)'s failure was largely due to their domestic problems rather than their wrongly directed foreign policies.

Ozawa Ichiro as a Secretary General of the LDP traveled to Moscow for a March 25 1990 meeting with Gorbachev and discussion of a \$26 billion aid package to be activated simultaneously with a peace settlement. However, Gorbachev feared that returning the islands to Japan

would set a precedent for other countries from which the Russians took territory during World War II to make their own territorial demands on the USSR. Moreover, he had to mollify the independence movements of many of the Soviet republics and deal with the spoiling tactics of the Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin, who stated that there would be no more Alaskas. Thus, The Gorbachev-Kaifu summit in April 1991 failed to produce a resolution to the disputes.

President Yeltsin also failed to deal with the disputes. Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin has tried to deal with the territorial dispute in exchange for Japanese large scale economic aid. However, Yeltsin had to cancel his planned visits to Japan two times, in September 1992 and in May 1993, because of domestic problems. In addition to Gorbachev's obstacles, the increasing status of the public and nationalism combined with the efforts of the politicians to score political points by using the territorial dispute issue, gave Yeltsin no choice except to maintain the status quo. In Japan, Yeltsin's behavior stirred up memories of past wars and of past humiliations. To the Japanese, Moscow's gradual posture, or step-by-step approach, represented nothing more than a delaying tactic to induce Japanese money without a resolution on the territorial issue. Although the economics stakes are high

for Japan in the Russian Far East,¹³⁴ the Japanese seems to prefer national prestige to those interests. Moreover, the Japanese seem to believe that Russia is in absolute need of Japanese hard currency with its abundant experience and capability to aid the development of Russian Siberia and the Far East. Thus, there is no need for Japan to conclude a peace treaty with Russia in a hurry.

On balance, the development of the Russian Far East requires abundant capital, advanced technology and skilled labor. These are not available in the Russian Far East, nor can the central government afford them. On whom then can the Russian Far East count? It will be its economically prosperous neighbors, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan. In view of this economic reality, the Russian leadership seems to realize that the only viable way to develop its Far East is to make the best use of the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific. It is widely acknowledged now that the development of Siberian and Far Eastern natural resources in an environmentally sustainable manner will depend crucially on the economic assistance and direct participation of Japan, South Korea, and other Asia-Pacific countries.¹³⁵ But, when we consider the size of South Korea's economy compared to that of Japan and its possible burden of unification,

there will be no alternatives except Japan. Therefore, until Russian domestic policy takes the right track, it seems that a significant breakthrough between Japan and Russia would be impossible. But, once the Russian government has success in dealing with its domestic problems and it starts to see the territorial disputes in a more pragmatic view, there would be no obstacles to the problem's solution.

During the Cold War especially since the early 1980s, Japan regarded the Soviet Union as the main military threat to their security. As the Cold War ended, Japanese threat perception from the Soviet Union, now Russia, changed considerably. It seems that the collapse of the former Soviet Union makes the Japanese feel more free from an imminent Russian military threat. In 1984, close to half of the Japanese thought the Soviets posed a military threat to Japan, and 42 percent did not. By 1990, the majority of the Japanese(60 percent) were convinced that the Soviet military threat was rapidly diminishing, while only 36 percent still held the view that it was not on the decline.¹³⁶

Apart from this perception by the people, it seems that Russia is still a main threat to Japan's security at the Government level. The 1993 Japanese Defense White Paper, stated:

The military forces of Russia are being reduced in General,..... It transferred a considerable portion of these weapons to the East of Urals,....Russian forces in the Far East exceed the bounds of defense requirements.Deployment of Russian forces in the Far East is concentrated on areas adjacent to Japan,.Japan needs to continue to watch Russian forces in the russian Far East region. ¹³⁷

Therefore, until the dispute over the Kurile Islands is resolved, Japanese threat perceptions of Russia would not be calm. In turn, Japanese uneasy relations with Russia probably will force Japan to maintain its military capability to a sizable degree. At the same time, Japan has no rationale to shift its economics-oriented foreign policy to a military- oriented foreign policy to deal with Russia.

c. Japan-China Relations

Until the late 19th century, Japanese society was based on Chinese culture, technology, and even political ideology. As the Japanese started to develop their country to catch up with the more advanced western countries, and when it tried to establish an empire through out the whole of Asia, Japan-China relations worsened. While post-World War II relations between China and Japan have been conducted under the Cold War logic in general, Sino-Japanese relations had different characteristics than that of

the United States and the Soviet Union relationship. China has rarely been threatening toward Japan. Japan also has tried to maintain its good relationship with China, at least in economic terms. These 'good' relations were further strengthened by the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties in 1972. Both China's desire to check Soviet hegemony and Japan's desire to expand its economic interests in China were served by the normalized relationship.

China is in the midst of its long struggle to catch up with the first rank nations of the world--a group to which it feels it should belong. The current ideological line is essentially Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism--"if it works, do it" or "if it catches mice, what difference whether the cat is black or white." This pragmatism has developed into China's "one center, two basic points" policy. The one center is that China must modernize as fast as possible. The two basic points are "economic reform full speed ahead" and "open up to the outside world." In order to achieve this goal China needs peace and stability in the world, especially around China. Deng Xiaoping said that "a peaceful environment is, naturally, a precondition, we expect at least seventy years of peace."¹³⁸

The collapse of the Soviet Union has changed China's security perception considerably. China gained double benefits from the end of the Cold War. The threat from the Soviet Union to China was reduced greatly, almost disappearing. The shift of the world's concern from military confrontation to economic competition increased China's security considerably and is the best condition for China to achieve its national goal--"modernization"--without wasting resources to maintain huge defense capability.

China often played off the Cold War bi-polarity exceptionally well. Therefore, the Soviet collapse meant to China that it had lost one lever to counter the other superpower. China was obliged to cope with the sole superpower, the United States on its own. China seems to see the present unipolarity of the world as more difficult, but less dangerous than the bi-polarity. The sanctions on China by Western countries led by the United States following the Tienanmen square incident, the Gulf War, and U.S. pressure on China's human right issues, do not threaten a nuclear holocaust but they do not end China's deep-seated quarrels with the lone remaining hegemon--the United States.

The Chinese feel uneasy about the formation of economic blocs. The emergence of Japan and European countries as well as the United States as economic giants make Chinese leaders feel that China again is left as a second class country, but they find their confidence being restored by the spectacular progress that China is making.

Although China's security perceptions have changed significantly, the picture of China's foreign policy has not changed much from that of the Cold War era: "anti-hegemony, peaceful coexistence, and third world champion."¹³⁹ Since the late 1960s, China had used its "anti-hegemony" policies to check the Soviet expansionism. But now, China is using this policy to check U.S. hegemony. China also has expressed its support for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty not for the purpose of countering Russia, but to check Japan's militarization. In line with this, the Chinese seek to exploit the contradictions which have surfaced recently between Japan and the United States over economic issues in order to enhance China's national interests and gain room for maneuver in Sino-US-Japanese relations. In other words, following the end of Cold War's triangular diplomacy, Chinese policy makers are keen to play the Japan card in their bilateral relations with the United States.

While China is making good relations with Japan to counter the United States' hegemony, its concern over Japan's possible emergence as a military superpower is also keen. An overwhelming majority of Chinese policy makers and analysts fear Japan's expansionist ambitions and want to keep a safe distance. Of particular concern to Beijing is the extent to which Japan's already predominant economic power will be translated into political influence and military power, and the challenge this might pose for China's own aspirations for political leadership.¹⁴⁰ An activist diplomacy and the attainment of great-Power status by Japan -- on a par with the United States and Western Europe-- would seriously undercut China's regional and global influence.¹⁴¹ That is why China views with concern the Japanese demand for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, because it will undermine China's status as the sole representative of Asian interests in that international body. Already Beijing has serious misgivings about Tokyo's slow but steady military buildup, and has voiced its concern over the dispatch of Japanese troops to Cambodia as part of a UN peacekeeping forces.¹⁴² Since the bitter memories of Japan's occupation of China, Korea and other countries in East Asia during the Second World War are still fresh, there is no enthusiasm in the region for an active Japanese

political and military role for fear of a revivalist Japan.¹⁴³ Nonetheless, China attaches great importance to maintaining good relations with Japan in order to ensure the further development of mutual economic ties and seeks to minimize differences over issues such as Diaoyutai Islands. From Beijing's perspective, economic and political ties with Japan not only bring it diplomatic gains in the short term but will also help it achieve China's long-term goal of restoring its grandeur. For the moment, therefore, China needs Japan at least as much as Japan needs China.

Japan's long historical relations with China and its position in Asia, force Japan have to maintain good relations with China. When Japan negotiated with the United States for the San Francisco peace treaty, it was very reluctant to recognize the Republic of China in Taiwan as a sole legitimate government in China. Although Japan had to recognize the ROC on Taiwan as the representative of China under the strong pressure of the United States from 1951 to 1972, it tried to maintain good relations with China, at least on economic terms through its *Seikei Bunri*(separate economy from politics) policy. Japan was the first major power to lift its economic sanctions on China following the Tienanmen incident. As a result of this policy, at present, Japan became the largest investor in China, and the

largest trade partner with China in 1993. Furthermore, Japan is well aware that it can not do much without China's cooperation in international politics. China's approval is crucial for Japan to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

In security terms, Japanese fundamental perception of China is that it is not a maritime power, but a continental one. Japan did not express much concern over China's nuclear capability during the Cold War era. Japanese shock after President Nixon's visit to China resulted from Japanese concerns that the United States might choose China as its ally in Asia in exchange for Japan. Nonetheless, Japan had not seen the Chinese as a security threat during the Cold War era as long as the United States remained in Japan. Japan believed that it could contribute to the maintenance of political stability in poor and communist countries through helping their economic development. This logic worked well vis-a-vis China during the Cold War era. Tokyo's key policy objective is to maintain regional stability in order to ensure the safety of vulnerable trade routes and its vast economic interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁴⁴ Political turmoil and economic stagnation in China could destabilize the whole region. In sum, the Japanese want to see a stable, but not too strong China.

And then, what are the reasons for Japan to increase its concern over the Chinese military, especially the naval buildup since the end of the Cold War? It seems that their priority concern is the protection of the SLOCs which are crucial for Japan's national survival, because of its dependence on sea transport. However, a different reason might be that the Japanese defense establishment needs a 'threat' to get the budgets approved, and retain the public's support. Another reason is that Japan wants to avoid an arms race with China. China has repeatedly denied its intention to buy an aircraft carrier from the Ukraine. One of the reasons for China to quit its plan is its concern for the regional naval balance. An advanced country such as Japan might be willing to invest in the necessary naval and air weapon systems to counter a Chinese naval buildup. China does not have any reason to waste its limited national energy, which could be well used for its economic development. This logic could be well applied for Japan, too. At the moment there is no reason for Japan to be particularly concerned about Chinese military interests. And, therefore, there is no reason for Japan to embark on a program that would make them a military superpower.

2. Economic Factors

Since Japan's security concern depends so heavily on economic factors rather than military ones, the economic conditions of Japan would be very crucial indicators for its security policy. The share of Japan in world exports and imports is 9.1 and 6.6 percent respectively, which shows how big Japan's economy is, and how deeply Japan is involved in world trade. The degree of Japan's dependency on imports for its total energy requirement was over 83 percent in 1991.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, Japan's import dependency on natural resources is the highest among OECD countries.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, Japan has no alternative but to depend on foreign trade for its economic survival.

As a result of its steady and high rate of economic growth through the 1960s and 1970s, Japan's economic behavior has changed significantly since the early 1980s. Trade conflicts with major countries resulted from Japan's vast trade surplus. Also contributing to the change, Japanese companies started to shift from chiefly exporters to true multinationals by increasing their foreign direct investment(FDI), which, they believed, would make the Japanese overseas position more stable, although it might create its own friction. When the 1980s began, Japan barely exported a yen in capital. It

had spent most of the postwar decades importing capital to finance its own development. However, with the strong Reagan dollar, and with a sharply falling budget deficit in Japan, with a rising current account surplus, Japan suddenly emerged as the world's single biggest source of capital. By the middle of the decade, it also was the largest overseas creditor. In 1985, its net exports of long-term capital reached \$65 billion; by 1987, they had reached \$137 billion a year, roughly equivalent to the GDP of Sweden.¹⁴⁷

Year	81	86	89	90	92
Trade Surplus	20.36	92.82	76.89	63.58	132.40
FDI	8.9	22.3	67.5	56.9	34.1

Table 3. Japan's Trade Surplus and FDI(selected years) (\$bn).

Source: Keizai Koho Center, "Japan 1994 an Intentional Comparison."

Capital exports are important for its security policy because, albeit indirectly, they involve two of the key elements of power: influence and dependence. They provide influence for those who spend the money and dependence for those who receive it. On the other side of coin of FDI, is that the spender also has some degree of dependency on the receiver for its profit and security of investment. Therefore, Japanese economic dependency on foreign countries would make Japan want to avoid military confrontation with most of the major countries.

In terms of Japan's economic relations with the United States, Japan is also deeply tied with the United States via East Asia's economy. Most of the East Asian countries' make profit in their trades with the United States, while they have huge trade deficits, (excepting China), with Japan. Japan had large surpluses in trade with South Korea(\$6.5 bn), Taiwan(\$12.0 bn), Hongkong(\$18.0 bn), and Singapore(\$9.0 bn) in 1992,¹⁴⁸ while the United States had substantial deficit with those countries.¹⁴⁹ This means that East Asian countries import Japanese technology and machinery to make goods and export those to the United States. Japan's capability to substitute the United States as a market for other Asian countries is in doubt. This reveals that Japan has too many risks in its confrontation with the United States-- for her sake and that of other Asian countries.

3. Domestic Political Factors

a. Public Opinion

Article 9 of Japan's Constitution, the one percent ceiling of defense budget, pacifist attitudes of the public, the three non-nuclear policies-- all have been used to explain Japan's reluctance to re-militarize. Among them, public opinion is the key factor to decide changes of those

policies. As has been revealed in Chapter III, in general the interpretation of Japan's Constitution has been modified into a more realistic school of thought. Japanese opinion about its security issue also has moved from an extreme leftist position toward a modified rightist position.¹⁵⁰

Two fundamental issues of Japanese debates over their security are how far Japan should go in building up its indigenous military capabilities, and what kind of defense relationship Japan should have with the United States. Four broad schools of thought have dominated Japanese debates over these issues.¹⁵¹ The first is represented by proponents of "unarmed neutrality(extreme left)." This school of thought was associated with the leftist Japan Socialist Party(JSP) and leading Japanese intellectuals and trade union organizations. These individuals are distrustful of both the Japanese military, which they regard as responsible for Japan's prewar expansionism and ultimate catastrophic defeat in World War II, and the United States, which they see as using Japan to further America's global ambitions. They see no external military threat to Japan's security. Indeed, their biggest fear is of the United States "dragging" Japan into an unwanted war in pursuit of its strategic objectives. With this orientation, they strongly oppose any change in Japan's Constitution, and they seek to reduce the SDF

to an "unarmed" or "lightly armed" territorial defense guard sufficient to maintain internal security. They also seek the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the adoption of an absolutely "neutral" foreign policy posture to avoid involvement in external disputes and the promotion of global disarmament. Although the JSP modified its critical stance, other leftists retain these views.

The second school of thought consists of those who advocate Japanese "independence(extreme right)." This school constitutes Japan's "Gaullists," a historically small but vocal group of people on the far right of the political spectrum who believe that full rearmament is a matter of national pride. They regard Russia as Japan's permanent enemy, and China as a potential threat and leading rival for influence in Asia. They seek a revision of the Constitution and elimination of the full range of governmental constraints on Japan's military buildup. They also want to revise the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in order to place Japan as an equal of the major powers.

Although these two schools of thought effectively bound the range of views in Japan, two other schools, both in the middle, have conducted the debate that has been important in policy terms since the early

1970s.¹⁵² One is represented by proponents of "basic defense capability(*kibanteki boeiriyoku*).\" This may be regarded as an extension of the conservative mainstream in Japan since the days of Prime Minister Yoshida in the 1950s. They argue that Japan needs only minimal defense capability to deal with limited and small-scale aggression. They support the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

While in general following the broad Yoshida line, proponents of basic defense capability represent an advance in two respects: (1) they postulate for the first time a certain minimum level of defense capability and responsibility that Japan needs to take on itself rather than simply relying on the United States to provided all of Japan's external security, and (2) they accept the need for expanded Japanese efforts toward preserving the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The Japanese government adopted this school of thought as its official policy in 1976 in the NDPO(*Boei Keikaku no Taiko*). Together with the Guidelines on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation promulgated in 1978, which provided for expanded Japanese participation in military activities with the United States, the NDPO serves as the basic documents structuring Japan's defense policy at present.

The other school of thought that has been important to policy making is represented by advocates of "autonomous defense." They are in the same position of the proponents of basic defense capability to support the U.S.-Japan close defense cooperation, while they argue three key points. They argue that Japan should give primary emphasis to its own defense efforts and supplement these with U.S. assistance. They reject the idea of limited and small-scale aggression as the target of Japan's rearmament and call for a more rapid and extensive defense buildup. They reject the use of assumptions about international developments and intentions of neighboring nations as the basis for estimating Japan's defense need. They argue that Japan should buildup its forces as required to deal with the military capabilities of potential antagonists.

The school of thought from the left was at the center of the security policy debate until the late 1970s. But from that time each party, such as Komeito and JSP, which represent the more pacifist feeling, had no choice but to change its key policies for party survival. In November 1979, Komeito officially announced its support of the Security Treaty with the U.S.¹⁵³ In May 1980, the Socialists also dropped its opposition to the Security Treaty with the United States and to the SDF. In 1981, Komeito

recognized the SDF as constitutional. Under Prime Minister Nakasone, the Japanese government's security policy shifted very much from left to right. This strong policy of Nakasone got the large approval of the Japanese public by winning in the 1986 general election. The LDP's seats expanded from 250(48.6 percent support) in 1983 to 300(58.6 percent support) in 1986. The Japanese attitude about the Constitution also changed significantly. The Japanese support for a revision of the Constitution increased from 28.3 in 1981 to 50.4 percent in 1993, while opposition to revising the Constitution dropped from 55.6 percent in 1986 to 33 percent in 1993.¹⁵⁴

Until the late 1980s, it seemed that Japanese consensus about its security policy has become the "autonomous position." But after the end of the Cold War, more especially after the Gulf War, Japanese debates about its security policy evolved to issues of how deeply Japan should be involved in world politics.

b. Impact of the Gulf War

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and speedy response of the United States and Western countries greatly influenced Japanese security concerns. The Japanese disagreed among themselves concerning the seriousness of the

issue. Setting aside the Japanese hostage issue, the crisis had only a limited impact on the daily lives of most Japanese. For this reason many people were inclined to act as if the crisis were someone else's problem illustrated by the Japanese proverb--"fire over the river." Public opinion was divided, and the proponents of "one nation(unilateral) pacificism" hindered the Japanese government from fully participating in international crisis management.

Given these circumstances, Japan had great difficulty in working out a policy package to contribute to international efforts to cope with the crisis. The government lacked both a grand strategy and experience in such crisis management. The Japanese people were not psychologically ready to make sacrifices, because Japan had enjoyed peace for the past forty-five years under the U.S. security umbrella. This tendency resulted in the disapproval of the bill which included a plan for dispatching SDF overseas in 1991. The international community, however, did not allow Japan to remain an outsider in the Gulf conflict. In fact, Japan had a great deal at stake in the conflict. International law and order are fundamental underpinnings of Japan's own peace and security. Furthermore, Japan depends heavily on oil imports from the Gulf.

Though Japan contributed US\$ 13 billion to the side of the Multi-National Force, it was criticized by many observers, particularly in the United States. The slow Japanese decision making process, the lack of a physical presence in the Gulf, and the indecisive attitude regarding Japan's role in restoring peace to the region contributed to make those criticisms.

The Japanese tended to feel ambivalent in response to international criticism. On the one hand, some felt dissatisfied that although Japan was helping to pay the bills, it was not participating in important policy decisions made by the United States. On the other hand, intellectuals in particular were disappointed by the Japanese government's indecisive response to the crisis and were prompted seriously to reconsider Japan's role in assuring world peace and stability. This latter group felt annoyed that even though Japan made a substantial financial contribution, it made almost no visible contribution in terms of personnel. They also were disturbed by the governments lack of clear vision and strategy regarding Japan's global responsibility. This would be summarized into the following three lessons:

1. The post-Cold War era will not be free of armed conflict.
2. Japan is unprepared to take a leadership role in international political affairs.
3. A nation cannot attain international stature by economic means alone.¹⁵⁵

Hence heated debates began on what, and how much, Japan should do for world peace and security. The debates continue, and the scope of discussion has expanded. Japanese now debate not only Japan's peace and security role, but Japan's global strategy, or lack thereof, as well.¹⁵⁶ The characteristics of these debates are much different from those of the Cold War era. Japanese security debates during the Cold War were limited within the scope of how much Japan would do about the responsibility for defending itself in the context of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and how much Japan would be involved in the scheme of the U.S. strategic concept for regional security. After the Gulf War, Japanese security debates were not limited within the domestic and regional spheres, but expanded to how much Japan should be involved in world politics for global security and peace, and with what kind of means.

As a result of these debates, Japan is sending some signals which include more progressive positions about its role in international peace and security. It may not be wrong to say that there is a growing consensus among the Japanese today, based upon the experience of the Gulf crisis, that Japan should assume larger responsibility and play a more active role in the world. We can find several elements which support this vision in political

speeches. The former Prime Minister Kaifu gave a speech to the National Diet in March 1990:

The new international order that we seek must be one that strives: first, to ensure peace and security; second, to respect freedom and democracy; third, to guarantee world prosperity through open market economics; fourth, to preserve an environment in which all people can lead rewarding lives; and fifth, to create stable international relations founded upon dialogue and cooperation.¹⁵⁷

One of the key players of the Hosokawa Coalition Government, Ozawa Ichiro said in his book "Blueprint for Building a new Japan" that:

Japan has no choice but to exert every effort to maintain peace, stability, and freedom in international society....Japan, more than any other nation, must work actively in discharging its responsibilities and role in attaining that goal. Japan has no other alternative but to become an "international nation" in the true sense.¹⁵⁸

Also, former Prime Minister Hosokawa expressed his opinion in his New Year's Day News Conference that Japan's prosperity is only possible if the world's free trade system is maintained.¹⁵⁹

Japanese debates over its global role developed into restructuring its political system. Although the direct cause of making opposition to the LDP in the July 1993 election was several major incidents of corruption¹⁶⁰, the Gulf War and the LDP's inability to respond were surely

one of the other key factors of the result. As a result successive Japanese governments have expressed much more progressive policy about its international roles.

In sum, the general trend in Japanese public opinion since the end of World War II has been shifting from purely pacifist to a more pragmatic nationalist position. Present Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama announced that the armed forces are legal, Japan's nuclear reactors, providing about a quarter of Japan's electricity, will not be shut down and the flag and anthem praising the Emperor will remain the national symbols.¹⁶¹ Normally, acknowledging the status quo is not news. But considering that the new Prime Minister is the head of the Socialist Party, which until now rejected all this as unconstitutional, threats to the people or symbols of the militarist past, the statements hinted at the pragmatism driving politics as Japan fitfully tears down and reconstructs its party system. This announcement tells us that Japanese society has moved to a relatively rightist position.

Therefore, the more rightist Japanese government and its people will have less obstacles to implement more active foreign and security policies. Moreover, revived Japanese national pride resulting from its

outstanding achievement in economic development, could make Japanese feel that Japan's culture and system is superior to those of Western countries as well as any other country. This would contribute to Japanese feeling of responsibility for leading international politics in every means. Japan, it seems, has reached a loose consensus for Japan's future direction; increasing "independence" in its security and foreign policy, and transferring its economic power into political power in world politics.

B. PROSPECTS

According to Robert Jervis, because of the very existence of nuclear weapons, economic factors will be a crucial factor which decides the power status in the future world politics. The increasing cost and decreasing benefit of war makes it impossible for advanced countries to risk war as an alternative to secure their national interests.¹⁶²

According to Kenneth N. Waltz, Japan is already a great economic power and there has been no country with great economic power that has not become a great political power, whether or not reluctantly.¹⁶³ Therefore, the key question is not whether the Japanese people wish their country to become a great power. The key question is will its people and its

leaders begin to feel that Japan needs the range of capabilities possessed by other countries in its region, and in the world, to cope defensively and preventively with present and possible future problems and threats?¹⁶⁴

As Bill Emmott pointed out, British dominance of world politics in the nineteenth century began when it started to export capital around 1815, and the United States' arrival as a capital exporter began in earnest in the 1920s and lasted until 1941, when it became the world's clear political leader.¹⁶⁵ To many, this suggested that the mid 1980s spelled the beginning of Japan's period of economic and, hence, political hegemony.¹⁶⁶ If Japan's exports of capital were extrapolated into the future, it would be the dominant economic power in the world by the turn of the century. The following sequence of events, which could lead, logically, to this conclusion, are summarized below.¹⁶⁷

- 1) Capital exports bring influence and establish dependence.
- 2) International efforts that require large-scale finance increasingly depend on Japanese cooperation. Examples extend from military action in the Gulf War and Cambodian peacekeeping operations to aid and loan programs for specific countries and multilateral agencies. Debtors' economic policies become geared toward Japanese acceptance.
- 3) These developments increase and broaden Japanese interests internationally. Thus, Japanese groups have more at stake in more hot spots around the world and have more concerns about the policies of other nations. Pressure will continue to grow on the Japanese government to intervene in more areas and circumstances.
- 4) Historically, military power lags behind economic power. Although,

Japan wants to remain pacifistic and lightly armed, it will increasingly possess the means (both financial and technological) to support a major military force. That will increase the temptation to resort to military means to address problems.

In the long-term, if Japan is becoming a political hegemon, then what is the future direction of its national strategy. Japan's future direction of national strategy would be focused on three dimensions: increasing independence in dealing with the United States-Japan Security Treaty, enhancing its political status in international politics, and increasing its efforts to secure economic interests.

However, Japan has very few possibilities to alter its security treaty with the United States to a fully "independent" security policy. Instead, Japan will deepen its security ties with the United States through increasing its share of responsibility. Japan would share the burden of the United States forces staying in Japan by more than 50 percent. Japan also would increase its efforts to improve cooperation with the United States, such as consulting on broad security issues at the ministerial level, cooperating closely on the operating level, and sharing advanced technologies for military uses. Japanese efforts to be an increasingly self-reliant military power will probably focus on a naval buildup. A naval buildup would contribute to

Japan's ability to secure its SLOCs out to 1,000 nm, a goal already expressed by former Prime Ministers Suzuki and Nakasone.

Japan's concept of comprehensive security will be applied more actively for its foreign policy to increase its national status in world politics. While Japan will try to institutionalize already established positions in world organizations, such as G-7, it will focus its effort on becoming a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council. For that purpose, Japan will use its ODA for more political objectives and it will participate very actively in peacekeeping operations by means of physical presence in addition to its financial support. In dealing with regional conflicts in Northeast Asia, Japan will try to increase the transparency of military issues, rather than try to organize a collective security system. In general, because neighboring states' approval is crucial for Japan's political purpose of being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Japan will keenly respond to their concerns.

To ensure its economic security, Japan will try to be involved more deeply in economic terms with countries which have strategic importance for Japan's economic interests. Japan's efforts will focus on two directions; reducing trade barriers and increasing FDI. The priorities of Japan's FDI

would be still the United States and Asian nations. Among the Asian nations, China and the countries which have abundant natural resources will be at the top of the list of Japan's FDI and ODA. But, in dealing with Russia, although there are vast economic interests in cooperating with Russia to develop the Russian Far East and Siberia, Japan will hesitate its economic investment and assistance to those regions until the territorial dispute is over. In conclusion, Japan will surely increase its military capability and will actively participate in the United Nations' activities, including peacekeeping operations. However, to regard Japan's activities as a indication of Japan's expansionism might be an overstatement. In the near future, Japan has no particular reason to increase its military capability to the level of the United States or the former Soviet Union.

VI. THE COMMON BASES OF SECURITY

COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA

AND JAPAN

A. SOUTH KOREA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

1. Unification

Koreans remember quite vividly the frustration and bitter experience endured by their ancestors at the dawn of this century. Korea lost its sovereignty to Japan in 1910 and was liberated from it in 1945 not by herself but by other foreign powers; the United States and the USSR. As a result, the Korea nation, was divided into two countries, which have extremely different political systems, and a terrible experience of civil war under strong influence of foreign powers. As a result, both Koreas had spent large amounts of their resources for their defense which has restrained their ability to engage in more productive activities.

Owing to its geographical location, the Korean peninsula has been the place of conflicts between continental power and maritime power in East Asia. As a people having a bitter history, Koreans bear in mind that they must maintain an independent, unified state, strong enough to keep its sovereignty for themselves, and they believe that it will also contribute to

the peace of the region. They realized a very common lesson of power politics; if you do not want war, prepare for war, and national power is fundamentally dependent on economic capability. Nowadays, while South Koreans think that they won the competition with the North because of South Korea's successful economy, they also realize that unification of Korea is essential for further economic development. Another factor which forces Koreans to regard unification as the ultimate goal is the people themselves. Before the division of the peninsula, Koreans shared the common experience of a peaceful community of one nation for several thousand years. At present, a quarter of South Koreans are immigrants from North Korea or their descendants. These factors reinforce their desire for unification.

2. Military Security

Apart from the experience of the Korean war, there are several factors which make South Koreans' desire to defend their country from North Korea's military threat the first priority of their policy. North Korea's strong military capability (more than 1 million) and their offensive strategy (65 percent of North Korean military are deployed around the Demilitarized

Zone[DMZ] are the primary indication of the North Korean threat.¹⁶⁸ South Korea's structural vulnerability created by an over-concentration of its economy around Seoul area (75 percent) and of the short distance between Seoul and the DMZ (26 miles) strengthens the North Korean threat. To meet this threat, South Korean governments have spent more than 6 percent of the ROK's GNP on defense expenditure until the mid-1980s.

The "dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources," makes it very difficult for South Korean government to spend large amounts of its budget on defense expenditures in the future. In South Korea, money for defense has always been a number one priority, but now the defense budget has become a pawn among politicians.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, as a very vulnerable country due to North Korea's threat, it is natural that South Korea's first concern must be the protection of its security on the Korean Peninsula as well as reducing its defense spending.

3. Economic Security

The dynamics of South Korea's economic growth over the last three decades can be understood as the successful implementation of an export-oriented industrialization strategy. Because South Korea does not have

enough natural resources upon which to base its export growth, the only way is to export manufactured goods in order to attain rapid economic growth. Consequently, South Korea's economy is doubly vulnerable. First of all, South Korea depends on exports for its economic growth. Secondly, it depends highly on foreign resources in order to make goods both for export and domestic demands. Thirdly, it depends on relatively few countries for both its export markets and resource suppliers.

In dealing with these problems, South Korea's achievements have been outstanding. It reduced its dependency on the Middle East for oil from 100 percent in 1978 to 56 percent in 1988. Its dependence on oil as a primary source of energy dropped from over 70 percent in 1979 to below 50 percent in 1991.¹⁷⁰

However, it can not unilaterally solve the fundamental problem--to secure stable supply sources and safe supply routes. Because of the structural vulnerability of South Korea's economy, the secure condition of its long sea lanes is virtually a matter of survival.

B. THE NEED OF COOPERATION WITH JAPAN

1. Economic security

One of the key factors why South Korea pushed the normalization talks with Japan was its need for Japanese economic aid. As the talks concluded, Japan began to provide South Korea with a total of \$800 million. This assistance became one of the contributors to South Korea's rapid economic development. Moreover, South Korea modeled itself on the Japanese economic development strategy and infrastructure. Japan has been one of the most important trading partner (29% of total imports in 1990, 21% of total exports in the same year) of South Korea, along with the United States. South Korea in 1992 exported US\$ 11.6 billion to, and imported US\$ 19.5 billion from, Japan. South Korea also has been within the top five trading partners of Japan (about 6.0% of its total trade in 1992). Japan's share of South Korea's technology imports had been over 50 percent of its total imports until 1990. An estimated 75 percent of South Korea's high-tech manufacturing equipment comes from Japan. While Japan only accounted for 17.2 percent of foreign investment in South Korea 1992, Japan brought 43.5 percent of the technology transfers.

Another point of economic relations between the two countries is that they compete with each other to get world markets. As South Korean firms lost competitiveness in many areas resulting from increased labor costs, South Korea's economy seeks to focus more on hi-tech industry. Therefore it needs Japan's assistance more, but Japan is hesitant to provide more high technology. The more Japan gives to South Korea, the stronger the competition it encounters from Korea.

Agriculture	Textile	Chemistry	Iron	Machines	Electronics
1.4	1.7	-2.3	-0.4	-5.95	-2.9

Table 4. South Korea's Trade balance in Major goods with Japan in 1991(\$billion).

Source: Korea Bank, "present trade balance with Japan," 1992.

Therefore, though there is deep interdependence between Japan and South Korea's economy, South Korea needs Japanese goods and technology more than Japan needs South Korean goods.

Also, South Korea and Japan's economies are in the same position in their dependence on foreign suppliers of raw materials, and in high dependence on foreign trade. South Korea's import dependency for its oil is 100 percent, mainly on the Middle East countries, and over 90 percent of its coal and iron ore, mainly from Australia and Canada. Except for

tungsten. South Korea depends highly on imports for its resources needed to make goods.¹⁷¹

While securing its SLOCs is a matter of survival to South Korea, it has almost no means to secure its extended sea lanes by its own military capability. Although South Korea has the opportunity to reach the resources that are abundant in the Russian Far East and the abundant labor markets in China's northeast provinces, its dependence on the sealanes for resource imports and goods exports can not be discounted. Therefore, the only choice that is left is military dependence on a country which has the power capability to secure the SLOCs. During the Cold War era, the United States had that capability, but as U.S. will and capability to do so declined resulting from the end of the confrontation with the Soviet Union, South Korea can not depend as fully on the U.S. guarantee for its SLOCs. Japan is in the exactly same position as South Korea. Therefore, whether it would be with the United States, or with Japan and China combined, South Korea has no choice but to cooperate with those countries which will perform that role. And then, which may be the most possible substitute for the United States to do that role in East Asia? When we consider their capabilities at present and their potentials, China and Japan will be the answers. However,

when we consider which country has at the greatest stake in securing its SLOCs, Japan is the one with an absolute need to do so. Also, it has been emphasized in the past that there was a big advantage for South Korea in cooperating with Japan concerning the Eastern Sea (Japan Sea) during the Cold War era.¹⁷² As shown in the Tumen River Development Program, the Eastern Sea becomes more important today not only for military security, but for economic and environmental purposes.

2. Politico- Military Security

Politically, although there have been ups and downs, generally the two countries have cooperated well within the framework of the United States' strategy. South Korea's efforts to deter North Korea and Japan's efforts to defend against the former Soviet Union's threat have been well harmonized by U.S. leadership. We can see the obvious evidence in North Korea's nuclear issue. Japan tried to normalize relationships with North Korea just after the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and the former Soviet Union.¹⁷³ But Japan suspended this negotiation when North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT. Furthermore, former Prime Minister Hosokawa was sending signals that South Korean President Kim's reform

was the model for his political reform. South Korea's need of cooperation has broadened from just economic cooperation to political cooperation. Although South Korea enjoyed great success in its foreign policy by normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and China under the name of "Northern Politics", it still has lots of obstacles to achieve its ultimate goal--reunification. Unfortunately, the issue of Korean unification is beyond the Koreans themselves. Without close cooperation with all the major powers which have their stakes in the Korean peninsula--the United States, China, Japan, and Russia -- Korean unification would be almost impossible. The relevant countries to the Korean peninsula are all trying to expand their sphere of influence on the Korean peninsula. Even the United States which has been regarded as a "bloody shared" ally by South Koreans, is moving toward recognizing North Korea and is making negotiations for diplomatic normalization between the United States and North Korea. The Geneva Agreement between the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, is generally regarded as a symptom of the United States shifting policy on the Korean peninsula.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, Japan should be recognized as one of the key players by South Koreans in order to achieve unification with the North under South Korean leadership.

The South Korean government might prefer gradual unification with North Korea to sudden unification resulting from a possible collapse by the North. South and North Korea should remain politically independent until their per capita income levels are roughly equal to minimize the cost of unification. At present, it is estimated that South Korea's GNP is fourteen times bigger than that of North Korea, and the South's per capita GNP is seven times bigger than that of the North.¹⁷⁵ It is best to boost North Korea's economy so that it, too, copes with the cost of uniting with the South. Many institutions estimated the total cost of Korean unification at between 200 billion U.S. dollars and 800 billion dollars.¹⁷⁶ During the Cold War era, South Korea was opposed to Japan's support for North Korea. The South Korean Government seemed to accept that Japan's support for North Korea would be helpful for reunification in the long run, while it worried about Japan's two Korea policy. Moreover, if sudden unification materialized through the collapse of the North Korean regime, South Korea's need for capital to revive North Korea's economy will become more urgent. In that case again, Japan is one of the plausible sources for financial help.

In security terms, there has been little evidence of direct cooperation between South Korea and Japan. But in actuality, under the framework of the United States' military guidelines, South Korea and Japan have cooperated very well. In 1969, Japan expressed the view "South Korea's security is essential to that of Japan." During the early 1980s, the South Korean government requested Japanese economic aid under the logic that Japan had to provide a large loan to help maintain South Korea as a 'bulwark' against communism.¹⁷⁷ Prime Minister Nakasone accepted this logic and extended \$4 billion in aid and loans to South Korea after long debates. Since the middle 1980s, Japan (1981) and South Korea (1988) have participated in the Rim-Pac Exercise. Most of the United States forces which have participated in the Team Spirit moved from bases in Japan, and in logistical terms, this situation became more important.

In dealing with North Korean threats, it is virtually a South Korean problem. However, Japan also has some problems from the North Korean threat inducing a possible refugee problem that could result from conflict on the Korean Peninsula and from pro-North Korean residents in Japan.

VII. THE ROLE OF KOREA

A. KOREAN'S VIEW OF JAPAN

1. South Korea

Two controversial factors coexist in the relationship between South Korea and Japan: the need for cooperation in real terms, such as economic, political, and even military; and distrust between the two peoples resulting from historical legacies. While the former has evolved very rapidly since diplomatic normalization concluded in 1965, the latter has improved very slowly and has the potential to make cooperation very difficult between the two countries.

Starting from Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to South Korea in 1983, there have been several apologies by the prime ministers and Emperors of Japan. In 1984, when he received President Chun, Emperor Hirohito said that "It is indeed regrettable that there was an unfortunate past between us for period in this century, and I believe that it should not be repeated." In 1990, Emperor Akihito (son of Hirohito) said, "I think of the sufferings your people underwent during this unfortunate period, which was brought about by my country, and cannot help but feel the deepest regret." Japan's former Prime Minister Hosokawa had summits with South Korea's

President Kim on November 6, 1993 in Kyungju. Prime Minister Hosokawa again expressed apologies for Japanese wrongdoing during the colonial era and promised to cooperate with the South Korean government closely in dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue. Unlike other Japanese prime ministers, Hosokawa was not reluctant in naming the atrocities such as banning the Koreans from using their own language, forcing them to change their names into Japanese, mobilizing Korean women as "sex slaves" for Japanese troops and forcing young men into labor camps. It appeared that Prime Minister Hosokawa's apology for the atrocities which Japan committed during its colonial rule satisfied most Koreans.¹⁷⁸

In response to this progress, South Korean President Kim Young Sam emphasized at the press conference after the summit, "We, South Koreans must not forget the past, but we must not cling to it any longer." President Kim said about the issue of comfort women long before the birth of the new Hosokawa Government and expressions of apology in Japan, "We will only demand a clear investigation into the truth of the matter; we will not demand material compensation."¹⁷⁹ He has expressed the view that the issues of history textbooks and comfort women are not South Korea's problem but are only Japan's domestic problem, thus we do not need to bother about those

issues. Also, President Kim ordered the demolition of two symbolic buildings which were built during Japanese colonial rule and had been used as important South Korean government offices, the old Blue House and the National Museum saying that "They are physical symbols of Japanese colonial repression, and people merely look at these buildings and feel resentment."¹⁸⁰

As a result of these efforts, it seems that most of problems over the historical legacies are resolved, at least at the government level, and South Korea has started to see Japan in real pragmatic terms escaping from the past ghosts. As a political procedure, only one step may be left; the Emperor's visit to South Korea or a unified Korea. But in the most fundamental people's feeling, it seems that it will take more time to rule out the historical bad memories from the two peoples' hearts. Recently, Shin Yong Ha, a professor at Seoul National University, said that, "We should urgently work out strategies to keep us from becoming subordinate to Japan, and furthermore to realize national reunification so that we can overtake Japan in the next century," in his book titled New Japanese Hegemony and Korea-Japan Relations.¹⁸¹ The spirit of "catch up to Japan" has been a major catalyst to make Koreans work so hard in economic development.

This feeling will last longer among Koreans than expected.

As the political issues have been resolved significantly, the economic issues between the two countries become key factors of conflict between them. Deep economic interdependency between South Korea and Japan, but in favor of Japan, is replacing the past historical legacies. South Korea's economic dependence on Japan has evoked strong resentment among Koreans reminding them a different form of "the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" which was used by Japanese before the end of World War II.

In national security, they have common interests in maintaining stability in the region. They are, however, well aware of each other. Recently South Korea broadened its definition of threat in a more comprehensive terms that sounds like Japan's.¹⁸² Japan also shifted its defense strategy with Korean tensions in mind.

This progress from the historical legacy to more pragmatic positions was possible because of the strengthened self-confidence of South Koreans resulting from their progress in economic and political terms, and their progressive perception of international politics. Since former President Roh Tae Woo launched his "Northern Policy", South Korean government foreign

policy has become more active. Present Foreign Minister of South Korea, Han Sung-joo, has expressed his policy base as follows: globalism, diversification, multi-dimensionalism, regional cooperation, and future orientation.¹⁸³ Based on this policy, South Korea seems to have set up three diplomatic goals: (1) improving its relations with neighboring countries, China and Japan, while maintaining and improving its ties with the United States and other traditional allies; (2) resolving North Korea's nuclear problem and to opening North Korea to the international community through close cooperation with the four major powers which are related to the Korean peninsula; and (3) developing APEC into a more comprehensive organization including security cooperation, such as a mini-CSCE.¹⁸⁴

South Korea is sending some significant signals to visualize its foreign policy toward Japan. South Korea has not expressed its opposition to Japan's efforts to contact North Korea for diplomatic normalization. Japan expressed its willingness to resume the talks with North Korea for diplomatic normalization, without tying the North Korean nuclear issue to preconditions on the resumption of the Pyongyang-Tokyo talks, when the delegation of the Japanese Social Democratic Party headed to North Korea in December 28, 1993, and formally proposed it in January 9, 1994. Japan's logic for

contacting North Korea is that isolation of North Korea would be harmful to maintain stability in the region, which, in turn, has been regarded as a by-product of Japan's two Korea policy which has encouraged division rather than reunification by Koreans.

South Korea's initial position in response to Japan's "sudden rapprochement" to North Korea in 1990 was that it would have not only a negative impact upon the inter-Korea talks, but also would make it more difficult for the realization of peaceful reunification of Korea. As the high cost of the reunification was revealed, and South Korea realized that sudden reunification would be a large burden for South Korea's economy, this policy has changed progressively. Foreign aid to North Korea would encourage it to open its society and could contribute to reducing the reunification bill. South Korea seemed to accept that Japan's support of North Korea is helpful for reunification, while it worries about Japan's two Korea policy. Moreover, if sudden unification materialized by the collapse of the North Korean regime, South Korea will need capital to revive North Korea's economy. In that case again, Japan is one of the powerful alternatives.

Moreover, South Korean ambassador to Japan, Gong Ro-myung expressed the view that South Korea should back Japan on the United Nations Security Council permanent membership issue.¹⁸⁵ Also, South Koreans are debating whether to lift the ban on Japanese popular culture imports from Japan.¹⁸⁶ Also, the rate of students going to Japan for study is sharply increasing while that of students going to the United States is slowing down.¹⁸⁷

In sum, political issues based on historical legacies have been at the core of the conflicts between Japan and South Korea. While the importance of political issues still exists, economic factors are becoming the core of the conflict between the two countries. Thus, Japan's economic leverage over South and North Korea will help determine the relations between them. If Japan supports North Korea for the purpose of opening its society under close consultation with South Korea, Japanese efforts will greatly contribute to rule out distrust between the two countries. But if Japan uses its economic leverage in order to strengthen North Korea's capability to compete with South Korea, and to maintain the present division, and to increase its influence through economic monopoly in North Korea, it will add another log to a demolishing fire.

However, in the future, the relations between South Korea or a unified Korea, and Japan will not be determined by themselves like the United States' strategy has influenced the relations between South Korea and Japan during the Cold War. In the face of a lessening United States military presence and influence in the region, other factor, such as Chinese and Russian strategies, will be the main external contributor to the relations between South Korea (or a unified Korea) and Japan.

2. North Korea

The political changes in Eastern Europe and the Tienanmen Square incident in China forced North Korean leaders to be concerned about domestic upheaval and maintaining its system as a communist country rather than competing with South Korea for the control of the whole Korean peninsula. North Korean President Kim Il Sung visited Beijing in November 1989. During his visit top-level leaders of North Korea and China exchanged views concerning party leadership and pursuing the way of socialism.¹⁸⁸

The Soviet Union's recognition of South Korea in September 1990, placed North Korea in an even more difficult situation. Their perception was

that South Korea will use the Soviet's position as an excuse to reunify Korea by absorbing North Korea as in Germany.¹⁸⁹

On the other hand, North Korea's spending of \$4.7 billion for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students held in Pyongyang in July 1989 to undermine the Seoul Olympics, made its economy almost unrecoverable.¹⁹⁰ Further, a shift in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries from planned economies to market economies struck an additional blow to an already troubled North Korea. The Soviets stopped their barter trade with North Korea and requested hard currency and, moreover, they started to sell Soviets oil to North Korea at international prices. This meant that a sharp decrease of the trade between North Korea and the Soviets which had amounted to about 60 percent of North Korean foreign trade at that time.

Thus, it appears that the most reasonable choice for North Korea was to suggest establishing diplomatic relations with Japan at the time when the Soviet Union was setting up diplomatic relations with South Korea. North Korea proposed the speedy establishment of relations with Japan to the Kanemaru-Tanabe delegation, which visited Pyongyang in September 1990, just prior to the establishment of relations between South Korea and the

Soviet Union. As the Secretary General of the Korean Worker's Party, Kim Yong Sun, frankly indicated to them, North Korea had decided to open diplomatic channels with Japan in order to adjust to the drastically changed international situation and to resolve severe economic difficulties. They also were confident that substantial reparations would accompany the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan, and thus North Korea could receive several benefits.¹⁹¹ This meant that North Korea was defeated in the diplomatic and economic realms in its 40-year-long competition with the South over the correct system of government in the same way that the Soviet Union was defeated in the long war of attrition between two competing systems known as the Cold War. There was no other reason for the proud North Korean leaders to propose the establishment of diplomatic relations to the Japanese delegation.¹⁹²

Based on this logic, North Korea suggested early diplomatic normalization with Japan when the delegates from the LDP and JSP visited in Pyongyang in September 1990. Although they held eight official meetings for diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea since their first official meeting in Beijing in November 1990, Japan and North Korea have failed to reach that goal. The major reason is the nuclear issue of North

Korea. Because the nuclear issue could not be solved by the two sides, Japan and North Korean negotiations for diplomatic normalization suddenly broadened into the issues of South Korea and most importantly of the United States with the North Korean nuclear issue.

North Korea seemed to realize that the main reason for its failure to achieve diplomatic normalization with Japan is not in the relations between North Korea and Japan, but in the relations between North Korea and the United States. And then, why did Japan suddenly change its Korea policy in 1989? Japan's new approach on the Korean Peninsula, seeking to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea while keeping good relations with South Korea, can be regarded as a reaction to policy shifts of the other three great powers toward the Korean Peninsula and the success of Seoul's *Nordpolitik*. It also reflects Japan's intention to occupy North Korea's market and to have a greater voice on the Korea problem.¹⁹³

During North Korea's talks with Japan, its intention was mainly caused by its desire for Japan's economic assistance. North Korea did request reparations from Japan not only for its colonial rule, but also for the 'sufferings' after World War II. As China's intention to recognize South Korea became obvious, North Korea's foreign policy was implemented by

its political purposes. North Korea was still opposed to cross recognition by the four major countries, which South Korea has insisted upon under its "Northern Policy".

But, as the international situation changed in favor of South Korea, and as South Korea expressed its intention to join the United Nations without considering North Korea's position, and China confirmed that it would not oppose South Korea's admission as a UN member, North Korea had no choice but to follow South Korea's policy. As a result South and North Korea were admitted as members of the United Nations in May 1991.¹⁹⁴

As China opened its ties with South Korea in August 1992, North Korea was isolated totally. From this time North Korea's policy has focused on achieving cross recognition from the United States and Japan. For the purpose of getting recognition and economic assistance, North Korea has been playing with its nuclear program. This means that North Korea worries that it would be absorbed by South Korea.

North Korea's position can be well explained by its unification policy at present. According to Lee Sam Ro, the head of North Korean delegation for North Korea-Japanese normalization talks, North Korea is trying to get

time to recover its national energy to compete with South Korea through making diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan and getting economic assistance as a byproduct of those negotiations, which may be real purpose of North Korea. Mr Lee stated:¹⁹⁵

The reunification of the Korean peninsula meets the strategic interests of the United States and Japan, both of which are deeply involved in Korean affairs. The United States and Japan must therefore not obstruct Korea's reunification but must develop their Korea policy so as to encourage its realization....It is essential in particular that the United States and Japan have the courage to correct their one-sided policy toward the Korean peninsula and pursue a fair and reasonable approach toward the North and the South that will be benefit efforts toward reunification as well as toward progress in improving the inter-Korean relationship. It is cold war thinking to blindly support one side only and remain unreasonably hostile to the other....For the sake of the reunification, the United states and Japan should, as a matter of course, adopt an equally balanced policy toward the two parts of the divided Korean Peninsula, and create a good atmosphere so as to encourage the two sides to understand and cooperate with each other on the way toward reunification.

Some people say that improved inter-Korean relations are the prerequisite for better DPRK-U.S. and DPRK-Japan relations, but we believe this is not the right logic. The "North-South dialogue first" approach, intended to improve DPRK-U.S. and DPRK-Japan relations, is really meant to increase the one-sided pressure of the United States, Japan and South Korea on the North. In effect, however, such pressure will result only in laying obstacles in the way of progress toward North-South dialogue and reunification. No outside pressure-political, military, or economic-will ever bring down our socialist system.

Thus, at present, North Korea's concern is to survive on its own terms and not to be absorbed by South Korea like Eastern Germany was by West Germany. And it is trying to develop its economy to open partially to foreign countries just like China has been doing since the early 1980s.

Based on this logic, North Korea's view of Japan is similar to South Korea's perception of the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and China. While South Korea's concern for Russia and China is mainly motivated by its political objectives, North Korea's present view of Japan is shaped by its need for Japanese economic assistance.

In sum, the relationship between Japan and North Korea has many obstacles to be overcome by the two sides. However, it will not take as long to resolve the historical issues between North Korea and Japan because South Korea has already spent much time doing so, and, as a result, Japan has gained experience coping with these problems. Moreover, North Korea's absolute need for Japanese economic assistance will force Pyongyang to approach diplomatic negotiations with Japan in a more pragmatic manner than Seoul-Tokyo negotiations during the Cold War era. But in general, North Korea's view of Japan will largely depend on the future development of unification issues.

B. IMPACT OF KOREAN UNIFICATION ON JAPAN'S SECURITY

It is assumed that future relations between Japan and a unified Korea will be competitive in all aspects.¹⁹⁶ For example, a unified Korea, despite confronting economic problems in the initial stage of unification, will prove in the long run to be a far more potent economy than the sum of its two parts. The economic competitiveness between the two countries will eventually come about when the difference in their respective economic strength narrows. In addition, as Japan's role increases in the region, a unified Korea will have to serve as a counter weight to excessive Japanese predominance in Northeast Asia whether of its own volition or that of others. This point is likely to spur friction and competition between the two nations.

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported in December 1993, that "With the fall of the Soviet Union, Japan's Self-Defense Forces shifted defense strategy from centering around Hokkaido and renamed the annual maneuvers of the GSDF. The northern mobile exercises have been based on the assumption of an enemy landing on Hokkaido since 1982, but after the fall of the Soviet

Union it was renamed the "long-distance special mobile exercise." The maneuver traditionally saw the movements of 5,000 troops, tanks, and weapons from Gumma, Aichi, and Kumamoto prefectures to Hokkaido. From 1996 on, however, the exercise will concentrate on moving troops and weapons to western Honshu and Kyushu as a consequence of Japan's perception that tension has shifted away from northern Japan, to the Korean Peninsula."¹⁹⁷

South Korea's Defense Ministry expanded its defense objective from "to defend the nation from armed aggression by North Korea" to "by potential adversaries."¹⁹⁸ This means that Seoul has expanded its definition of an enemy from just North Korea to a more comprehensive term (which actually includes Japan and China)

A well-known Japanese author and TV personality, Tanemura Kenichi, reportedly said, " An all-out invasion of Japan by Korea is inevitable if Korea is unified... therefore it is in Japan's best interest to help North Korea economically so the Korean Peninsula remains divided as now."¹⁹⁹

Is unification of Korea a real threat to Japan's security and to peace in Northeast Asia? The answer depends on what kind of country a unified Korea will be. The future of a unified Korea will be a crucial factor which decides not only the future of Japan's security policy, but also the future of international politics in Northeast Asia.

1. Security Threat

Some Japanese prefer the present state of tension in Korea to the instability they imagine might come with unification. They worry that a united Korea might turn its considerable military energy against its historical enemy Japan. Although talk of invasion is preposterous in light of Japan's naval advantage, the combination of North Korea's 1.1 million strong active forces and South Korea's 660,000 armed force would dwarf the number of Japan's modest 250,000-person SDF. Most frightening of all is the prospect that a united Korea might possess nuclear weapons. It has been repeatedly said that North Korea could be able to manufacture a small number of nuclear weapons by the year 1995. If Koreans come to possess nuclear weapons, the Japanese may have to reconsider their own inhibitions toward nuclear armament.

Threat assessments are based on perceived intentions as well as capabilities. Some Japanese fear that a united Korea would be motivated to turn its military attention toward them. In Korea hatred toward Japan is today overshadowed by the North-South confrontation. Following reunification, this internal focus may shift to an external subject. The resentment no longer would be dissipated by division.

There is one factor to support these assessments --nationalism. One of the main motivators of South Korea's rapid economic development is surely the South Koreans' desire to catch up with Japan. Similiarly, North Korea has managed its country under the *Juche* ideology, which empahsizes the concept of independence to the extreme of autarky. For the purpose of strengthening *Juche*, Pyongyang has cultivated its people's strong animosity to foreigners, especially to the Japanese and Americans. If Korea's unification is facilitated by concentrating national energy in the name of nationalism, it could be easily translated into anti-Japanese sentiment. This feeling could be converted into military escalation to a level which might be perceived as a threat by its neighbors. This, in turn, would create a security dilemma.

The argument that a unified Korea will be a great threat to its neighbors, however, is based on the assumption that Korea will maintain a sizable military force comparable to the combined forces of North and South Korea. A unified Korea, given its geography and historical experience, will always need to maintain a sizable defense force. But the need to maintain large military forces is in doubt. Given the traditional benchmark for armed forces strength of one percent of population, a united Korea could be expected to keep about 650,000 troops for its defense.²⁰⁰ Moreover, considering the great cost of rebuilding North Korea, maintaining a large military will not be the top priority of a unified Korea.

Furthermore, maintaining a large military force might complicate reunification. Because of the high strategic value of the Korean peninsula, the nations of Northeast Asia do not want a unified Korea to be dominated by any one of its neighbors, nor do they want a unified Korea with enormous military strength.²⁰¹ In any case, Korea's neighbors would not easily accept reunification that kept over 1.7 million men under arms. Korean unity will take place within the framework of the international community. Seoul and Pyongyang both envision the major powers providing some sort of security guarantees to a united Korea. In exchange, the major

powers will undoubtedly want to see Korea make guarantees similar to those pledged by united Germany.²⁰² These would include a renunciation of mass-destructive weapons and a limit on total armed forces. This is also compatible to Korea's national interests.

Moreover, both North and South Korea have developed a military structure that focuses on an army and air force rather than, on a navy. It is generally accepted that a naval buildup requires more money and time than to build either an army or an air force. Thus, it would take a long time for a united Korea to develop a naval capability to threaten Japan.

The next point is the question of Korea's intention to threaten Japan. Historically Korea has rarely invaded Japan. During the 13th century, Korea was involved in the Mongol invasions of Japan. Except for that, even when Korea's national power was regarded as far ahead that of Japan, Korea has never tried to invade Japan. Moreover, because of the vulnerability of Korea's economic structure, Seoul could expect no benefit from war. Korea needs peace and stability not only to facilitate reunification, but also to maintain its international position among great powers.

2. Economic Threat

A united Korea, with its diligent work force, a highly educated population, of 65 million, and a greatly reduced defense budget, would be a strong economic power, especially in sectors where South Korea already has a geographic and product advantage. South Korean *Chaebol* are strong in the areas where Russia and China seek investment: construction and heavy engineering, as well as cars and consumer goods. Korea's lower-cost goods are said to be more suitable for the relatively primitive post-communist economies than are Japan's high-tech, precision products. The industries and firms of a unified Korea may be freer from the political considerations in trading issues. This will be of greater advantage to Korean companies in investing in the Russian Far East than to Japanese companies.

In sum, the fundamental premise of this argument is that Korea and Japan's economies have very similar structures. As a result, Korea and Japan will compete with each other to secure raw materials and export markets. However, in terms of natural resources, they are in a position of cooperation rather than of competition. Because it is generally believed that natural resources are abundant to share with each other, and their SLOCs for resources imports are far beyond their own jurisdiction, the two

countries need to cooperate rather than compete with each other.

In dealing with export markets, Korea and Japan are in the same position. As world economies form regional blocs, the room becomes very narrow and further trade will be dealt with on a bilateral basis vis-a-vis countries. Because Japan and Korea are in very similar positions to cope with trade issues and in dealing with regional or global economic blocs such as the EC, NAFTA, APEC, and GATT, the need for cooperation becomes more critical than the pressures for competition between Japan and Korea.

Moreover, after unification, Koreans will be preoccupied internally. All available capital will be channeled into reconstructing the thread-bare North. The daunting task of infrastructure investment and industrial retooling will take years.²⁰³ The present needs of South Korea for Japan's high technology and North Korea's needs for Japan's capital and technology will not change dramatically after unification. This will increase economic interdependence between a unified Korea and Japan. Economic interdependence does not mean cooperation in and of itself, but it will contribute to making a united Korea and Japan more cautious to criticizing each other.

The concern that a unified Korean economy will be an excessively strong competitor for Japan's economy is illogical. Economies are not engaged in a zero-sum game. Co-prosperity will make the two countries see each other with a fairness. As South Korea's economic success will contribute to resolving historical problems, a prosperous economy of a unified Korea will help Koreans to see Japan in a more progressive light. This relationship will be applied to the Japanese, too.

3. Fear of Refugees

Many Japanese worry that Korean reunification, even through peaceful means, would flood Kyushu with refugees. In this nightmare, the image of a geopolitical dagger is transfigured as a human wave. An influx of Koreans is doubly feared, because they are most able to blend among the Japanese people due to their similiar shape and cultural bases. The Japanese think that the Koreans already living in Japan are trouble enough.

Fears of a "human wave" of Korean refugees have been greatly exaggerated. Foreign affairs critic Hideki Kase writes, "while the exact number of Korean refugees who successfully fled to Japan before and during the Korean War is unknown due to their ability to blend in with the resident

Korean community, the figures may be as high as 200,000-500,000."²⁰⁴ This estimate is widely repeated in Japan, without much analysis. Numbers this high would mean that one quarter to one-half of the ethnic Korean community in Japan came voluntarily at a time when well over a million Koreans were moving the other way. The actual figures on illegal immigration, according to the Ministry of Justice in Japan, were 45,960 Koreans arrested trying to enter Japan from April 1946 to 1951.²⁰⁵ Moreover, comparatively few came during the Korean War itself, even when it appeared that Communists might take over the whole peninsula (2,434 arrested in 1950 and 3,503 in 1951). If unification is realized as a result of the collapse of North Korea, because of their language and education, it will be easier for North Korean refugees to get jobs in South Korea rather than in Japan. Already in South Korea, more than 200,000 illegal immigrants are working, which means that South Korea has some capability to absorb North Korean workers.

VIII. CNCLUSION

The end of the Cold War and the relative decline of the United States' commitments for regional defense in the Western Pacific, makes the region's security very complex. Japan's emergence as an economic superpower with the existing historical legacies of Japanese military expansionism, intensified the complexity of the region's security environment. It has increased people's concern about Japan's future intentions, especially in terms of its security policy for the region's peace and stability.

It seems that Japan is already acting as one of the political superpowers in world politics with its vast economic resources. Japanese society is moving toward becoming a "normal nation," which means that it becomes easier for Japan to develop its military capability. Japan has the capability to build up its military in a large scale. Thus, the future direction of Japan's security policy depends on Japanese intentions rather than Japan's capabilities.

The Japanese has been very reluctant to increase their military capability even under the security threats from the communists bloc-- mainly the Soviet Union-- during the Cold War era. While the Japanese

attitude has moved toward right position, their perception of threat has decreased significantly resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Japan's security policy will be mainly influenced by its foreign relations rather than by its own initiative. There is little possibility for Japan to collide with the United States and China. While the prospects for Japan's security relations with Russia are not so bright, the possibility of collision is not high, either. Thus, the future direction of Korean unification will significantly influence the region's security environment, especially Japan's security policy.

The situation on the Korean peninsula looks very serious today because of North Korea's nuclear issue. But in the long run, it seems that South Korea is in a good position to achieve its ultimate goal of reunification. However, there are many obstacles for South and North Korea to achieve that goal. Unfortunately, since the division of the Korean peninsula was not decided by their own will, but by foreign powers, it will be very difficult to unify the two Koreas into one Korea without getting all four major powers' cooperation. All the four powers are playing off one another and the two Koreas for their own national interests. Thus, if the conflicts among the four powers intensify around the Korean peninsula,

Korea will have to face another risk of being a scapegoat for other big power countries' power politics. Therefore, South Korea's need for cooperation with the four powers-- the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, becomes very high. Among them, China and Japan's position will be much stronger than their role during the Cold War era.

Economic growth will be the main factor strengthening South Korea's position in dealing with unification problems and post-unification issues (i.e, to build up North Korea's economy to a common level). For this reason, the stability of Northeast Asia is a necessity for South Korea. Therefore, for South Korea or a unified Korea, the need for cooperation is bigger than that of confrontation with neighboring countries.

It seems that it will not be so difficult for South Korea or a unified Korea to manage its foreign relations with the United States, China, and Russia compared to Japan, because of the historical legacies between the Koreans and the Japanese. Conversely, the necessity for cooperation with Japan for South Korea's national interests(or a unified Korea) is bigger than that of any other country. Thus, if South Korea or a unified Korea could not escape from the ghosts of the past in its relations with Japan, it would be more harmful to South Korea or a unified Korea.

The first requirement for good relations between any two countries is to see each other as they are, and to respect each other's advantage as much as possible. In line with this, the Korean perception of Japan and vice versa should shift from antagonism to cooperation. Korea (the South and the North) should recognize the value and position of Japan which has been outstanding in adopting advanced Western technology and systems since the late 19th century. Although Korea and Japan have adopted Confucianism for a long time, it would be better for Korea to adapt the stronger points of Japanese culture that are more pragmatic than that of China and Korea. Korea should respect Japanese achievements of economic growth and its efforts to restructure their society from war-like expansionism to a democratic pacifist society. Korea (both the South and North) would be better to seek its national interests as much as possible in Japan's Korea policy rather than just blaming Japanese policy on the Korean peninsula as a two Korea policy. Koreans should see Japan with the most pragmatic point of view, like they do other major powers. One thing is abundantly clear. The maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is vital to Japan's security and economic interests. This means that the Japanese do not have valid concerns about the unification policy of a divided or unified

Korea, as long as it meets Japan's national interests-stability.

Japan's military buildup and its military activities in UN peacekeeping operations should not be seen from the point of view of Korea-Japan bilateral relations. The United States and China have the same fear about Japanese military expansionism. Korea does not need to spend its national energy on concerning too much about Japan's military buildup. The United States, China, and even Russia will try to check that. The real thing for Koreans to worry about is not the military buildup of Japan, but cooperation among the four powers to control the Korean peninsula against Koreans' will. In any case, Japan is one of the biggest trade partners of South Korea and, even after unification, this situation will not change soon.

The Japanese perception of Korea should also change for the better for Japan's national interests. The Japanese should highly regard the value of the Korean peninsula for its own security, as Hisahiko Okazaki said in his book, A Grand Strategy for Japaneses Defense. Okazaki asserts that "Japan's security is threatened when the forces of the Asian continet are not constrained by a principle restricting foreign expeditions and military conquest; and when the resistance of the Koreans collapses."²⁰⁶ " Moreover, the Japanese should devote their efforts to helping South and

North Korea achieve peaceful unification. After unification, it would be better for Japan to help Korea recover from its unification problems. Japan must not forget that Korea is not the same country it was in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. It would be better for Japan's national interests to help Korea maintain its independence as a stable country powerful enough to resist any external threats rather than for Tokyo to try to control the Korean peninsula again.

Here, in sum, is my conclusion on Korea-Japan relations. Unification is Korea's destiny and it would be better for Japan to give its full help toward that goal. A Korea that is unified will be strong enough to resist any internal or external threats. And it will be an important factor in contributing to the stability and prosperity of all Northeast Asia.

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